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The U.S. government maintains a vast amount of personally-identifiable
information on millions ofAmerican citizens. Much of this information is contained
in electronic databases maintained by federal agencies. Various Freedom of
Information Act (FOJA) requesters, such as journalists, marketers, and union
organizers seek this information for different purposes including investigative
reporting and targeted solicitations. These kinds of uses are known as "derivative
uses" because this government-compiled information is requested for purposes
other than the official purposes for which the information was originally gathered.
These and other derivative uses of personally-identifiable information often
implicate privacy concerns. Conversely, restrictions on public access to federal
agency records can pose negative public policy implications. This article explores
the continuing conflict between protectingpersonalprivacy rights and safeguarding
public access rights to personally-identifiable information under FOIA.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court has eschewed finding a general First Amendment right
of access to government-held information under either the free speech or free press
clauses of the First Amendment.' Writing for the Supreme Court in 1978, former
Chief Justice Warren Burger said public access to government information must be
determined instead by "carefully drawn legislation," and the "political forces in
American society."2
To provide public access to government information, Congress and every state
legislature have enacted varying degrees of statutory access to government
information.3 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),4 passed by Congress in
1966, generally requires that records held by federal executive branch agencies must
be made available to the public.5 In crafting FOIA, Congress recognized the
See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that press access to penal
institutions was a legislative question); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (holding that
denying inmates access to media was not a violation of their First Amendment rights); Saxbe
v. Wash. Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1973) (holding that reporters have no constitutional right to
interview prisoners); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that compelling a
newspaper reporter to testify before a grand jury was constitutional); Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1 (1965) (holding the Secretary of State could enforce an executive order that prohibited
issuing a passport to travel to certain nations). However, the Court has recognized a qualified
First Amendment right of access to criminal court records and proceedings. See Press-Enter.
v. Riverside Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that public access to preliminary
hearings in criminal trials was constitutional); Press-Enter. v. Riverside Superior Court, 464
U.S. 501 (1984) (holding that the accused's right to a public trial outweighed the
government's interest in keeping sensitive information secret); Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that the press and public may attend a murder trial
even though details may leak).
2 See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 14-15 (quoting Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975)).
3 President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the FOIA bill into law on July 4, 1966. See 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1989). State public-records laws have a longer history. State statutes providing
for public access to government records were enacted as early as 1849, when the Wisconsin
legislature passed a public-records law. See Comments, Public Inspection of State and
Municipal Executive Documents, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1105, 1105 (1976). By 1950, at least
twenty-seven states already had enacted limited open-records statutes. See HAROLD CROSS,
THE PEOPLE'S RIGHTTO KNOw 337-47 (1953). Today, all fifty states have open-records laws
enacted by their legislatures.
4 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1989).
' Id.; see also S. REP. No. 89-813 (1965), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES 38 (Comm.
Print 1974) [hereinafter FOIA SOURCE BOOK]. The FOIA source book is a primary source
for the legislative history of FOIA, containing congressional reports, hearings testimony and
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important need for citizens in a democracy to have access to government
information in order to participate in self-rule.6 However, legislators also
understood the government's need to keep some information confidential and the
individual's need for privacy.' Congress thus included nine exemptions to the Act,s
two of which allow federal agencies to withhold information to protect the personal
privacy of individuals identified in records and databases.9
The FOIA privacy exemptions seem to place the public interest in full public
disclosure of government-held information in an adversarial relationship with the
individual privacy interest in nondisclosure.' ° Capturing the essence of this
conflict, constitutional scholar Thomas Emerson wrote that while full disclosure of
government-held information is the public's "principal source" of information about
other materials. See generally id.
6 A 1966 House report on FOIA noted the "intelligence of the electorate varies as the
quantity and quality of its information varies." See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497 (1966), reprinted
in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 33. A 1965 Senate report observed that the "very
vastness of our Government and its myriad of agencies makes it difficult for the electorate"
to gain access to public information. See S. REP. No. 89-813 (1965), reprinted in FOIA
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 38. "[I]t is only when one further considers the hundreds of
departments, branches, and agencies which are directly responsible to the people, that one
begins to understand the great importance of having an information policy of full disclosure."
Id.
7 See FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 38.
8 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)1-9 (1989). FOIA does not apply to matters that fall under the
categories of: (1) classified information and national security, (2) internal agency personnel
information, (3) information specifically exempted from FOIA disclosure under another
federal statute, (4) trade secrets and other confidential business information, (5) agency
memoranda, (6) disclosures that invade personal privacy, (7) law enforcement investigation
records, (8) reports from regulated financial institutions, and (9) geological and geophysical
information. Id.
9 Exemption 6 states that FOIA does not apply to matters that are "personnel and
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)6. Exemption 7 permits withholding "records
or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such law enforcement records or information... could reasonably be expected
to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)7. Neither the
original FOIA nor its exemptions referred to electronic information such as databases.
However, the 1996 amendments to FOIA, known as the Electronic Freedom of Information
Act, explicitly defined records as including information compiled by the government in all
of its forms, including electronic and digital materials. See Electronic Freedom of
Information Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 3, 110 Stat. 3049 (1996) [hereinafter
EFOIA Amendments].
10 See, e.g., Robert Gellnan, Public Records - Access, Privacy, and Public Policy: A
Discussion Paper, 12 Gov'T INFO. Q. 391, 391 (1995) (stating there are "sharp conflicts
between privacy advocates and information users over the availability of [personal
information in public records].").
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the operations of government, concerns for the privacy of individuals identified in
government-held information requires consideration of some limits on disclosure. "
Concerns about the use of government-held information have increased over the
years as computerized federal agency databases have accumulated tremendous
amounts of personally-identifiable information such as names, addresses, and social
security numbers. 2 The conflict between access and privacy interests is heightened
when personally-identifiable information in government records is requested by
nongovernment parties for so-called "derivative uses" - meaning uses for purposes
other than the official purposes for which the information was originally compiled.
For example, labor unions might want a list of names, addresses, and phone
numbers for federal employees so that they can contact employees for collective
bargaining purposes. 3 Alternatively, a commercial business might want income
data gathered as part of the U.S. census in order to identify and target individuals
for direct-mail advertising for products ranging from burglar alarm systems for
inner-city residents to luxurious ocean cruises for upscale suburban dwellers.'4
Such derivative uses also arise in instances when public records are used by
journalists to investigate stories,"' by corporate intelligence firms to conduct
individual background checks, 6 by lawyers to identify potential witnesses to
contact and interview, 7 or by political and other organizations to seek names and
" Thomas L. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 18
(1976).
12 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS, available at http:/Iwww.ftc.govlbcplprivacylwkshp97/irsdoc2.htm (last visited
Sept. 3, 2003) (concluding that public records are a "rich source of personal identifying
information"). For purposes of this article, "personally-identifiable information" is defined
as information that can be used to identify or locate a specific individual and includes such
data as names, addresses, social security numbers, dates of birth, employment dates, and
salaries. This definition is based on one used by the Federal Trade Commission. See id.
"3 See Dep't of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth. (FLRA), 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
14 See Direct Marketing Association, Understanding Privacy, at http://www.the-dma.org/
library/privacy/understanding.shtml (last visited July 20, 2001, (stating that direct marketers
rely on public records and other sources of personally-identifiable information to "more
accurately target offers to prospective customers"); see also Joseph E. Phelps & Matthew D.
Bunker, Direct Marketers' Use of Public Records: Current Legal Environment and Outlook
for Future, 15 J. INTERACTIVE MKTG. 33, 35 (2001) (discussing the importance of public
records as a source of information for direct marketers) [hereinafter Phelps & Bunker].
's See Matthew D. Bunker& Sigman L. Splichal, RelationalPrivacy Cases and Freedom
of Information, 18 NEWSPAPER RES. J. 109 (1997); see generally Brooke Barnett, Use of
Public Records Databases in Newspaper and Television Newsrooms, 53 FED. COMM. L.J.
557 (2001).
16 See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 159-60 (1967); FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, supra note 12.
'7 See generally FLRA, 510 U.S. at 487; Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991)
(concerning lawyers who attempted to gain contact information for returned Haitian
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addresses to solicit new members or disseminate literature. 8 A recent study
indicated that forty percent of all FOLA requests made in the first six months of
2001 came from corporations and twenty-five percent from lawyers.' 9 Journalists
made five percent of the FOIA requests during this time period, and public
advocacy groups submitted eight percent. The remainder of the requests came from
individuals and other groups.20
Policy debates over the disclosure of personally-identifiable information in
government records and databases have focused mainly on two points: first, how
requesters would use this information (what this article calls the "derivative uses"
of personally-identifiable information); and, second, what the resulting
consequences might be for the individuals named in the records (referred to in this
paper as the "secondary effects" of disclosure).2 Clearly, technological advances
such as computerized databases and the Internet, have escalated the conflict
between disclosure and privacy as technology increasingly is harnessed by
corporations, lawyers, journalists, and others, to gather identifying information on
private citizens from a myriad of sources, including public records covered by
FOIA.22 While technology can make access to electronically-stored information
faster and cheaper, it can also make invasions of personal privacy far easier.23
refugees).
18 See generally Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355 (1997).
'9 See Mark Tapscott & Nicole Taylor, Few Journalists Use the Federal Freedom of
Information Act: A Study by the Center for Media and Public Policy, The Heritage
Foundation, available athttp://www.heritage.org/Press/MediaCenter/FOIA.cfm (last visited
Feb. 4, 2003).
20 See id.
"1 See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (holding that Congress had the power
to regulate the states' disclosure of personal information contained in their DMV records);
L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (holding that a
private publisher could not challenge a state statute that regulated access to information
police departments possessed as to arrestees' addresses).
22 FOIA access to agency records contained in databases was mandated by Congress in
1996 when it passed the Electronic Freedom of Information Act (EFOIA). See EFOIA
Amendments, supra note 9, §§ 1-12 (amending sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552). Congress
enacted this law because legislators wanted to add certain electronic provisions to the original
act in order to make clear that the statute's disclosure requirements applied to electronically
recorded information and databases. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N.
23 See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 12 (concluding that privacy
concerns over personally-identifiable information in public records have been heightened by:
increasing availability of electronic data; ease of collating and aggregating electronic data
from various sources; increasing computer processing speeds; decreasing costs of electronic
data storage; and increasing affordability computers); see also FRED H. CATE & RICHARD J.
VARN, COALIMON FOR SENSIBLE PUBLIC RECORDS ACCESS, THE PUBLIC RECORD:
INFORMATION AND PRIVACY AND ACCESS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR FINDING THE BALANCE
15 (1999) ("[Tlechnologies, such as the Internet, that expand opportunities for easy,
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Whether courts weighing personal privacy against public access interests under
FOIA should, or even can, consider the derivative uses or secondary effects of
disclosure of personally-identifiable information remains unresolved by the
Supreme Court and unexplored in any great depth in FOIA literature and
commentary. One reason this issue remains unresolved is that many FOJA users,
and freedom-of-information activists in general, have shied away from raising the
issue.24 Many believe that if the courts explicitly decide that derivative-use and
secondary-effect considerations are permissible, then federal agencies could exploit
the uses and effects of disclosure as an excuse to deny access to records. 5 In
inexpensive access to public records also increase the ability of the government and citizens
to search and collect disparate pieces of data to 'profile' individuals, thereby heightening
concerns about personal privacy."); Phelps & Bunker, supra note 14, at 34 (stating that the
use of computerized public records containing personally-identifiable information by
marketers implicates privacy concerns, especially when citizens are compelled to provide that
information to the government under the auspices of a different purpose - such as motor
vehicle or voter registration).
24 Some FOIA activists argue that the purpose for a FOIA request should not be a factor
when agencies or courts consider whether the information should be disclosed. They point
to FOIA's plain language and legislative history to support their claims. See The
Implementation of the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996: Is
Access to Government Information Improving?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov't
Mgmt., Info. and Tech. of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong.
(1998) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Jane E. Kirtley, Executive Director, Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press); Senator Patrick Leahy, The Electronic FOIA
Amendments of 1996: Reformatting FOIA for On-Line Access, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 339, 340
(1998); see also REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 105TH CONG., REPORT ON
RESPONSES AND NON-RESPONSE OF THE EXECUTiVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES TO CONGRESS'
FINDING THAT THE FOI ACT SERVES 'ANY PURPOSE' 2 (Comm. Print 1998) [hereinafter
RCFP REPORT]. This report was prepared by request of Rep. Steven Horn, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology.
' These concerns are not unfounded. According to a 2002 Justice Department analysis
of recent agency annual reports, the personal privacy exemption, Exemption 6, was the most
commonly used of all of FOIA's nine statutory exemptions to reject FOIA requests. See U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Office of Info. & Privacy, SUMMARY ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2000, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost3.htm (last visited
Feb. 4, 2003). The history of FOIA privacy disputes that have reached the Supreme Court
over the years shows the Justice Department has been highly effective, as the legal
representative for federal agencies, in arguing for the withholding of records. To date, the
Court has heard seven FOIA privacy cases since 1976, and it ruled in favor of agency
decisions to withhold records in all but one of those cases. See Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert
Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355, (1997); Dep't of Def. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487 (1994); Dep't of State
v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (199 1); Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749 (1989); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615 (1982); Dep't of State v. Wash. Post
Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982); Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). These cases
concerned either the personal privacy exemption - Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)6 - or
the privacy subsection of the law enforcement exemption - Exemption 7, 5 U.S.C. §
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practical terms, a derivative-use analysis arguably is integral to both sides of the
privacy/access equation. The value of access to certain records might not be fully
revealed without considering how the information would be used once released.
For instance, a journalist might utilize information from an agency record to
identify a source to interview who can shed light on agency operations. Likewise,
the individual privacy interest in secrecy might not be fully illuminated until the
privacy impact on individuals named in records is considered along with the
potential public interest uses of the information.26 Thus, the journalist's request for
an interview with an individual named in an agency database might be considered
to be an invasion of that individual's privacy.
The need for a meaningful derivative-uses analysis gains further importance in
light of the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence, under which the Court considers
derivative uses and secondary effects of disclosure on the privacy side as a matter
of course, but not on the public-interest side of the balance." Additionally, the
Department of Justice, which Congress charged with overseeing FOIA operations
when the statute was enacted,28 has weighed in on the question squarely in favor of
protecting privacy.29 In October 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a
memorandum to the federal agencies strongly encouraging agencies to use the
privacy exemptions to withhold records requested under FOIA as long as there is
a sound legal basis to do so.3"
At the time of this article, the Supreme Court had granted certiorari n the case
of Office of the Independent Counsel v. Favish.31 Favish involved a FOIA request
for death scene and autopsy photographs relating to the fatal shooting of former
White House Deputy Counsel Vincent W. Foster, Jr.32 As will be discussed in this
article, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, held that the U.S. Office of the
Independent Counsel could withhold six of the requested photographs on grounds
that the surviving members of Foster's family had a sufficient FOIA-related privacy
552(b)7(C). Most of these cases will be discussed in detail later in this article.
26 As one FOIA commentator stated, "Derivative use analysis ascertains how requested
information will be used and whether that use will cause invasions of privacy, serve public
interests, or both." Eric J. Sinrod, Blocking Access to Government Information Under the
New Personal Privacy Rule, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 214, 214 (1993).
27 See Bibles, 519 U.S. at 355; FLRA, 510 U.S. at 487; Ray, 502 U.S. at 164.
28 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
29 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFO. & PRIVACY, NEW ATTORNEY GEN.
MEMORANDUM ISSUED (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2001foia
postl9.htm [hereinafter NEW ATTORNEY GEN. MEMORANDUM] (last visited Feb. 4, 2003);
see also Martin E. Halstuk, In Review: The Threat to Freedom of Information, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., January/February 2002, at 8; Adam Clymer, Government Openness at
Issue As Bush Holds On to Records, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at Al.
30 See NEW ATTORNEY GEN. MEMORANDUM, supra note 29.
3' 2003 WL 2011010 (U.S. 2003).
32 Id.
20031
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interest to keep the photographs hidden from public view.33 Significantly, the Ninth
Circuit explicitly utilized a derivative-uses analysis when weighing the privacy
interest of Foster's family. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the mere
release of the photographs would not necessarily invade the family's privacy as
would potential media coverage and publication of the photographs, including
publication on the Internet.34 The Favish case presents a clear opportunity for the
Supreme Court to clarify the issue of when, if ever, derivative uses may be properly
considered by courts weighing disclosure decisions under FOIA privacy
exemptions. As pointed out later in this article, the Supreme Court explicitly
avoided that issue in a 1991 FOIA privacy exemption case,3' but has since
continued to tacitly approve a balancing scheme that seemingly utilizes a derivative-
uses analysis when considering the privacy interest in nondisclosure but not the
public interest in disclosure.36
The purpose of this article is to shed light on the continuing conflict between
safeguarding personal privacy and allowing derivative uses of government
information under FOIA. In section one, the article discusses FOIA and outlines the
statute's two privacy exemptions.37 The second section reviews a series of
3 See Favish v. Office of the Indep. Counsel, 2003 WL 1263948 (9th Cir. 2002), affg
in part and rev'g in part, 2001 WL 770410 (C.D. Cal.).
- See Favish v. Office of the Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000). In
addition, the Ninth Circuit clearly extended the privacy protection of FOIA beyond Foster,
the individual who was the subject of the photographs, to his family. See id. (citing Katz v.
Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., 862 F. Supp. 476, 485 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd on other
grounds, 68 F.3d 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and N.Y. Times Co. v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space
Admin., 920 F.2d 1002, 1009-10 (D.C. Cir. 1990), remanded to 782 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C.
1991).
31 See Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991).
36 See infra text accompanying notes 227-29.
37 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)6, (b)7(C) (1994). In a memorandum issued October 12, 2001,
Attorney General John Ashcroft wrote, in part, that the government is "committed to full
compliance" with FOIA, but he added that the Justice Department and the administration are:
equally committed to protecting other fundamental values that are held by our
society. Among them are safeguarding our national security, enhancing the
effectiveness of our law enforcement agencies, protecting sensitive business
information and, not least, preserving personal privacy... I encourage your
agency to carefully consider the protection of all such values and interests when
making disclosure determinations under the FOIA. Any discretionary decision
by your agency to disclose information protected under the FOIA should be
made only after full and deliberate consideration of the institutional, commercial,
and personal privacy interests that could be implicated by disclosure of the
information. (emphasis added).
Ashcroft's memo went on to rescind the previous FOIA disclosure standard set by former
Attorney General Janet Reno. The Reno FOIA policy emphasized "maximum responsible
disclosure of government information" unless "disclosure would be harmful" (emphasis
added). U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GEN.'S MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF DEP'TS &
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Supreme Court cases in which the government raised a FOTA privacy exemption to
block disclosure of personally-identifiable information in federal agency records.38
Sections three and four demonstrate how the Supreme Court has considered
derivative uses and secondary effects in these cases - but only on the privacy side
of the privacy-access balance, and to justify withholding of records. Section five
examines the implied constitutional right of "informational privacy" that courts
have applied to some personal information in government records and databases.
This section also looks at how the Supreme Court considered derivative uses and
secondary effects in its scant constitution-based informational privacy
jurisprudence. 9 Section six explains how a variety of public interests are not served
when federal agencies withhold government-held information, as a matter of course,
under a theory based on impermissible derivative uses and secondary effects.
Finally, section six also proposes a model and system of analysis that courts can use
to clearly identify the leading kinds of derivative uses and thus fairly balance
privacy rights of the individual against the public interests that disclosure would
serve.
I. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND PRIVACY
Enacted by Congress in 1966 and amended several times,4" FOIA creates a
judicially enforceable policy that favors a general philosophy of full disclosure of
federal agency records.4' FOIA's legislative history demonstrates congressional
intent for a broad policy of full disclosure based on democratic political theory and
a philosophy of open government.4" Legislators noted that transparent government,
AGENCIES REGARDING THE FREEDOM OF INFO. ACT (1993), reprinted in FOIA UPDATE 4
(1993) [hereinafter ASHCROFTMEMORANDUM]. Ashcroft replaced Reno's foreseeable-harm
standard with a test that encourages withholding based on a "sound legal basis." NEW
ATTORNEY GEN. MEMEORANDUM, supra note 29.
38 See Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355 (1997); Dep't of Def. v. FLRA,
510 U.S. 487 (1994); Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749 (1989); Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982); Dep't of the Air
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
3 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425
(1977).
4 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994). Congress revised FOIA in 1974, 1976, 1978, 1984, 1986
and 1996.
41 See S. REP. No. 89-813 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 38;
see also Rose, 425 U.S. at 361. But see Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774-75 (holding that
the central purpose of FOIA is to disclose only those records that directly shed light on the
operations of the government).
42 See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497 (1966), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5,
at 33; S. REP. No. 89-813 (1965), reprinted in FOIASOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 38. The
impetus behind FOIA's broad policy of full disclosure was to remedy gaping loopholes in
FOLA's predecessor, the public disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure Act of
2003]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
subject to public and press scrutiny and evaluation, has a long and historic tradition
in the nation."
FOIA applies to "record[s]" held by "agenc[ies]" within the executive branch
of the federal government," including the Executive Office of the President and
independent regulatory agencies45 such as the Federal Communications
Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission.' FOIA makes agency records available to "any person"47
upon request and places the burden ofjustifying nondisclosure on the government.4"
FOJA requests can be made for any reason,49 without requiring either a showing of
relevancy or an explanation for a request.5 0
1946, commonly referred to as the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946). Among these loopholes
was the requirement that "even 'matters of official record' were only to be made available
to 'persons properly and directly concerned' with the information." See EPA v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 79 (1973). Under this provision, requesters had to explain how the requested
information concerned them in order to justify disclosure. Congress crafted FOTA after
legislators concluded that the APA's restrictive disclosure requirements failed to meet that
statute's intended disclosure goals. Indeed, the APA was so easily exploited that it came to
be regarded by agencies as a tool to withhold information. Id.; see also H. REP. No. 89-1497,
at 5-6 (1966), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 26 ("For more than 10
years, through the administration of both political parties, case after case of improper
withholding based upon [the APA] has been documented."); S. REP. No. 89-813, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., 5 (1965).
4" During a hearing on the original FOIA legislation before it was enacted, then-U.S.
Representative Donald Rumsfeld advocated its passage, quoting Thomas Jefferson's famous
remark: "Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without
newspapers or newspaper without government, I should not hesitate for a moment to prefer
the latter." FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 72.
4 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (1994), amended by EFOIA Amendments, supra note 9.
45 id.
46 id.
41 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1994). The term "any person" is defined as including individuals,
foreign nationals, partnerships, corporations, associations or foreign or domestic
governments. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (1994). The statute specifically excludes federal
agencies from the definition of a "person," but state agencies can make FOIA requests; see
also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFO. Acr GUIDE & PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW 38
(2002) [hereinafter FOIA GUIDE].
48 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)(b) (1994); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,
437 U.S. 214, 235-36 (1977) (requiring the board to meet the burden of justifying
nondisclosure); Mink 410 U.S. at 73, 79, 87.
'9 See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 47, at 39-40 (stating that "FOIA requests can be made
for any reason whatsoever; because the purpose for which records are sought has no bearing
upon the merits of the request, FOIA requesters do not have to explain or justify their
requests. As a result, and despite repeated Supreme Court admonitions for restraint," FOIA
is often used as a substitute for, or a supplement to, discovery in both civil and criminal
litigation).
" Id.; see also Durns v. Bureau of Prisons, 804 F.2d 701, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
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FOIA contains two privacy exemptions that represent congressional attempts
to balance individual privacy interests against public access to government
information. Under these provisions - Exemptions 6 and 7(C) - agencies may
withhold documents on grounds of protecting the individual interest in privacy of
the individuals named in agency records." However, the exemptions do not define
the parameters of agency discretion in privacy-based FOIA denials,5" and thus the
task to decide FOIA privacy-exemption disputes is left to the courts. This section
analyzes the language and legislative histories of the privacy exemptions in search
of legislative intent on whether derivative uses of information and secondary effects
of disclosure should be considered as reasons to block the release of government-
held information requested under FOIA.
A. Exemption 6: Personnel and Medical and Similar Files
Exemption 6 allows agencies to withhold "personnel and medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy."53 The threshold question under Exemption 6 is whether the
requested information fits the description "personnel and medical files and similar
files."54 If it does, the second question in the inquiry considers whether "disclosure
... would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.,
55
In passing FOIA in 1966, Congress recognized a need to protect some
personally-identifiable information contained in the records of dozens of federal
agencies such as the Veterans Administration, the Selective Service, the Bureau of
Prisons, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 6 The House Report
recommending passage of FOIA pointed out that the myriad federal agencies
("Congress granted the scholar and the scoundrel equal rights of access to agency records."),
cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds and remanded, 486 U.S. 1029 (1988);
Forsham v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (reasoning that while factors
such as need, interest, or public interest may bear upon an agency's determination of order
of processing, those factors have no bearing on a person's right of access under FOIA); see
also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFO. & PRIVAcY, REPORTERS Comm. DECIDED
BROADLY, 10 FOIA UPDATE 5 (1989).
" 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)6, (b)7(C) (1994).
52 The House report recommending passage of FOIA said it was intended to establish
"workable standards for the categories of records which may be exempt from public
disclosure ... with specific definitions of information which may be withheld." H.R. REP.
No. 89-1497, at 1 (1966).
13 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)6 (1994).
' See supra note 47. The Supreme Court clearly took this two-prong approach in the first
two Exemption 6 cases it decided. See Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595,598,
602-03 (1982); Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 370 (1976).
5- See supra note 47.
56 See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 32 (1966).
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gathered vast quantities of information on intimate details about millions of citizens,
and that confidentiality of these records had been maintained by agency regulation
but without statutory authority.57 Addressing the personal privacy interests protected
by Exemption 6, the report said:
A general exemption for the category of information is much more
practical than separate statutes protecting each type of personal record.
The limitation of a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy'
provides a proper balance between the protection of an individual's right
of privacy and the preservation of the public's right to Government
information .... 58
Similarly, the corresponding Senate report clarified the "clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy" standard expressed in Exemption 6." Congress
intended for this language to maintain a balance between the "protection of an
individual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation
of the public's right to governmental information."'
Congress thus recognized that FOIA disputes under Exemption 6 would likely
involve a balance of conflicting interests in public access and individual privacy.6'
For example, the Senate report noted that while FOIA enacts a broad philosophy of
"freedom of information," Congress also needs to protect "equally important rights
of privacy" regarding certain information in government files, including medical
and personnel records.62 The report stated:
It is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but it is not an
impossible one either. It is not necessary to conclude that to protect one
of the interests, the other must... either be abrogated or substantially
subordinated. Success lies in providing a workable formula which
encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yetplaces emphasis on
57 Id.
5' Id. The House report further stated: "The exemption is also intended to cover detailed
Government records on an individual which can be identified as applying to that individual
and not the facts concerning the award of a pension or benefit or the compilation of
unidentified statistical information from personal records." Id.
59 S. REP. No.93-813, at44 (1965).
o Id. (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 38 (stating that balancing these interests "is not an easy task," but requires a
"workable formula"); see also Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 373 (1976)
("Congress enunciated a ... policy [regarding Exemption 6], to be enforced... by the
courts.").
62 S. REP. No. 93-813, at 38 (1965).
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the fullest responsible disclosure.6 3
This quoted passage suggests that Congress did not intend for rights of privacy to
easily trump those of public access in a FOIA balance under Exemption 6.
B. Exemption 7(C): Information Compiled for Law Enforcement Purposes
In 1974, Congress amended FOIA and added Exemption 7(C), which allows
agencies to withhold "records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records
or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy."' The two-pronged disclosure analysis first asks
whether the requested information constitutes "records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes," and, if so, next asks whether disclosure "could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy. "65
Exemption 7(C) provides broader protection for individual privacy than does
Exemption 6. In other words, it is easier for an agency to deny a FOIA request on
privacy grounds under Exemption 7(C) than under Exemption 6. For instance,
under Exemption 7(C), the agency need only show that disclosure of the requested
information "could reasonably be expected" to constitute a privacy invasion, not
that it "would constitute" a privacy invasion as required under Exemption 6.66 Also,
under Exemption 7(C), the agency needs only to demonstrate an "unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy," not a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy" as required by Exemption 6. Congress seems to have intended these
distinctions, 67 and the Supreme Court has recognized them in Exemption 6 and 7(C)
63 Id. (emphasis added).
64 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)7(C) (1994).
65 Id; see also FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 622 (1982) (calling this analysis a "two-
part inquiry"). The Supreme Court has held that "information initially contained in a record
made for law enforcement purposes continues to meet the threshold requirements of
Exemption 7 where that recorded information is reproduced or summarized in a new
document prepared for a non-law-enforcement purpose." Id. at 631-32.
' See Dep't of Def. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487,496 n.6 (1994); Dep'tof Justice v. Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989)(emphasis added).
67 The legislative history shows that Exemption 7(C), as originally proposed by Sen.
Philip Hart, also required a "clearly" unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. See 120
CONG. REc. 17,033 (1974) (emphasis added). However, the word "clearly" was dropped by
the Conference Committee as a concession in negotiations with President Gerald Ford to get
the Act approved. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1380, at 4 (1974). By dropping "clearly," the
exemption lessened the agency's burden to meet the test. Legislators also agreed to the
difference in language between "would" in Exemption 6, and "could reasonably be expected"
in Exemption 7(C) in order to enact the legislation. As a result, courts have concluded that
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cases.
68
In making a determination in a privacy-exception case under Exemptions 6 and
7(C), the courts use a two-prong test. Under Exemption 6, the courts first must
determine if the records fall within the definition of "personnel," "medical," or
"similar" files.69 Second, the courts must balance the invasion of the individual's
personal privacy against the public benefit that would result from disclosure.70 To
withhold information, the government must show that the disclosure "would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. '71 Likewise, the
courts use a similar test in deciding an Exemption 7(C) privacy-interest case.72
Under Exemption 7(C), the documents first must have been compiled for law
enforcement reasons because this exemption pertains only to investigative records.73
Second, the government must prove that the disclosure could "reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. 74
The FOIA privacy exemptions are broadly worded. Congress did not define any
of the key terms, including the clause "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"
in either exemption. However, the legislative histories strongly suggest that only
significant privacy concerns should trump public access rights to FOIA records,75
and the Supreme Court has concluded that the privacy exemptions must be narrowly
construed.76 In addition, the legislative histories do not indicate whether the courts
should - or must - consider derivative uses of government information or
secondary effects of disclosure when weighing the individual privacy interest in
nondisclosure and the public interest in disclosure.77
Exemption 7(C) allows law enforcement officers more latitude to withhold records to protect
privacy than is permitted under the stricter standard of Exemption 6. See Reporters Comm.,
489 U.S. at 755-56. In addition, Exemption 7(C) means the public interest in disclosure
carries less weight. Ild.
61 See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 755-56 (citations to various legislative materials
omitted); Abramson, 456 U.S. at 629 n. 13 (calling the distinction between "unwarranted" and
"clearly unwarranted" a "meaningful" one); Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,
380 n.16 (1976) (citations omitted).
69 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)6 (1994).
70 See, e.g., Rose, 425 U.S. at 352.
71 id.
71 See, e.g., Wash. Post, 456 U.S. at 595; Rose, 425 U.S. at 352.
73 5 U.S.C. § (b)7(C).
74 Id.
71 See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497 (1966); S. REP. No. 93-813, at 44 (1965).
76 See Rose, 425 U.S. at 361.
71 See Jeffery D. Zimmerman, United States Dep't of State v. Ray: The Distorted
Application of the Freedom of Information Act's Privacy Exemption to Repatriated Haitian
Migrants, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 385,414 (1993) (stating that "[n]othing in the text
or legislative history of the Freedom of Information Act supports the contention that the
public interest in requested information must be in the disclosure itself and not in any
possible derivative use") (citations omitted).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ACCESS-PRIVACY BALANCE AND THE "CENTRAL
PURPOSE" DOCTRINE
In passing the FOIA privacy exemptions," Congress acknowledged the legal
and traditional protections afforded to privacy over the years and tried to provide
a means of resolving conflicts between access and privacy interests in requests for
agency records that contain personally-identifiable information. However,
Congress left the exemptions largely undefined and thus subject to varying
interpretations and applications by federal agencies and the courts, particularly the
Supreme Court. Indeed, since FOIA was passed, the Supreme Court created a
framework for balancing public access and personal privacy interests in disputes
over the release of government-held information in a series of cases.79 These cases
remain controversial, and commentators have accused the Court of judicially
legislating a balancing scheme that strongly favors individual privacy over public
access despite evidence of congressional legislative intent to the contrary.
0
In Department of the Air Force v. Rose,"l decided in 1976, the Supreme Court
addressed an Exemption 6 case for the first time and created a balance that weighs
the public interest in disclosure against the individual privacy interest in keeping the
information confidential.82 However, in Department of State v. Washington Post
Co.,83 an Exemption 6 case decided in 1982, the Court held that even a minimal
78 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(I)-(9) (1995); supra note 8.
9 See Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355 (1997); Dep't of Def. v. FLRA,
510 U.S. 487 (1994); Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749 (1989); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615 (1982); Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co.,
456 U.S. 595 (1982); Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
80 See, e.g., Martin E. Halstuk & Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest Be Damned:
Lower Court Treatment of the Reporters Committee "Central Purpose" Reformulation, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 983 (2002). In a 1998 report, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press asserted that since the Reporters Committee decision was handed down, the balance
in the test between individual privacy and the public interest in disclosure has weighed
heavily in favor of privacy. See REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, REPORT ON
RESPONSES AND NON-RESPONSE OF THE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES TO CONGRESS'
FINDING THAT THE FOI ACT SERVES 'ANY PURPOSE' 2 (1998) (prepared by request of Rep.
Steven Horn, Chairman, Subcomm. on Gov't Mgmt., Info. & Tech., of the House Comm. on
Gov't Reform & Oversight). Any asserted FOIA-related public interest that does not fall
within the Supreme Court's narrowly defined definition of the Court's central-purpose
doctrine is not considered, the report said. See id. at 2-3. Since the Reporters Committee
decision was handed down, many journalists have complained that they have been thwarted
in fully reporting news on important issues because federal agencies overuse the privacy
exemptions. See id at 3.
8' 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
82 See id. at 372-73.
83 456 U.S. 595 (1982).
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privacy interest could trigger the balancing analysis in an Exemption 6 dispute. 8
Seven years later, in Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press,5 a 1989 case decided under Exemption 7(C), the Court further skewed
the balance strongly in favor of privacy interests over access interests.8 6 The Court
formulated the now-familiar "central purpose" test, which created a de facto rule
against the disclosure of any personally-identifiable information in federal agency
records. 87 An understanding of these three cases is necessary to approach the
derivative-use issue, which will be discussed in forthcoming sections.
A. Department of the Air Force v. Rose (1976)
In Rose, the dispute concerned a FOIA request for summaries of official
proceedings against Air Force Academy cadets accused of honor and ethics code
violations.8 8 The records were sought by the New York University Law Review,
which was researching an article on military disciplinary procedures.89 The law
review did not request the names of individual cadets, but instead requested
summaries with "personal references or other identifying information deleted."9
The Air Force denied the request, and the law review filed suit in federal
district court to compel disclosure. 9' Without examining the summaries, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that Exemption 6 did not
apply because release of the summaries were not "medical and personnel files and
similar files."92  However, the judge ruled against disclosure under another
exemption, Exemption 2, which protects an agency's internal personnel memoranda
from disclosure.93 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed and held that Exemption 2 did not apply.94 The appeals court ordered the
Air Force to produce the redacted summaries to the trial judge for in camera
inspection to determine whether Exemption 6 applied.9"
' See id. at 602.
85 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
86 See id. at 774, 780.
87 See id.
88 See Rose, 425 U.S. at 354-55.
89 See id.
90 Id. at 355.
91 See id. at 355-56.
92 Id. at 357-58; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)6 (1995) (containing the text of Exemption
6). The trial court had granted summary judgment for the Air Force without examining the
redacted summaries. See Rose, 425 U.S. at 356-57.
9 See id. For the text of Exemption 2, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)2.
4 See Rose v. Dep't of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 266 (2d Cir. 1974).
95 Id. at 268.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court order, holding that the redacted
summaries qualified as "similar files" under Exemption 6,96 but the records had to
be released unless disclosure would result in a "'clearly unwarranted' invasion of
privacy."97 Because the Air Force had never produced the summaries in the
proceedings below, they were not part of the record on appeal. For this reason, the
Rose Court was unable to balance the actual access and privacy interests implicated
by disclosure of the requested records. Instead, the majority simply agreed with the
Fifth Circuit that the trial judge needed to inspect the summaries in camera and
balance the salient access and privacy interests.9" Accordingly, the Court upheld
the appellate court order compelling the Air Force to produce the redacted
summaries to the trial judge to inspect the summaries99 and to determine if redaction
would sufficiently "safeguard privacy." "0
Writing for the Rose Court, Justice William J. Brennan said that FOIA's
legislative history made it clear that the statute was "broadly conceived" and
Congress intended for the statute to permit access to official information and to
open agency action to public scrutiny.' Further, he said that any exceptions to
disclosure must fall under one or more of the statute's nine exemptions," 2 which
should be "narrowly construed."' 3 The opinion took the position that FOIA's
"dominant objective" is disclosure."o
The Rose Court cautioned against broad application of the FOIA privacy
exemptions.' t For instance, Brennan said that "Exemption 6 does not protect
against disclosure [of] every incidental invasion of privacy - only such disclosures
96 See Rose, 425 U.S. at 376-77. The Court said the summaries were "similar files" under
Exemption 6 because they "relate[d] to the discipline of cadet personnel" and implicated
"privacy values" as those implicated by information in personnel files. Id.
9' Id. at 380-81.
98 See id. at 381 (stating that an in camera inspection of the redacted summaries by the
trial judge was the appropriate procedure as had been ordered by the court of appeals below).
99 Id.
lo Id. at 380-81. The Rose Court said that redaction of identifying information is an
appropriate means by which to protect individual privacy and still allow for public disclosure
of the remaining information. See id. at 381-82 (stating that "redaction is a familiar technique
... [and FOIA] exemptions... were intended to be practical workable concepts") (citing
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973)). However, the Court noted that redaction might not
necessarily be a perfect means of achieving anonymity for the cadets discussed in the
summaries. See id. at 381 (stating that "redaction cannot eliminate all risks of identifiability,
as any human approximation risks some degree of imperfection, and the consequences of
exposure of identity can admittedly be severe").
... Id. at 361 (citing Mink, 410 U.S. at 80).
102 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
103 Rose, 425 U.S. at 361.
'4 See id.
105 Id. at 381-82.
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that constitute 'clearly unwarranted' invasions of personal privacy."' 6 In language
that seemed to bode well for access advocates, Brennan said that Congress clearly
directed Exemption 6 "at threats to privacy interests more palpable than mere
possibilities."'' 7 He said Congress intended to craft a personal privacy exemption
that "would require a balancing of the individual's right of privacy against the
preservation of the basic purpose of [FOIA] 'to open agency action to the light of
public scrutiny."' 8
B. Department of State v. Washington Post Co. (1982)
The Supreme Court next addressed Exemption 6 in 1982 in Department of State
v. Washington Post Co.,'09 the first news media case involving a disclosure dispute
under Exemption 6. In an apparent departure from Brennan's clear admonition six
years earlier - that FOIA's exemptions, explicitly Exemption 6, should be
"narrowly construed" "0 - Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist strongly suggested
that even a minimal individual privacy interest is sufficient to trigger Exemption 6
and invoke the privacy/access balancing analysis."' In a unanimous opinion, the
Court held that a file need not contain highly intimate personal information to be
blocked from disclosure under Exemption 6.12
The privacy dispute in Washington Post arose in September 1979 after the
newspaper wanted to confirm an unofficial report that two officials of Iran's
revolutionary, anti-American government held U.S. passports." 3 The newspaper
asked the State Department for passport-information records to determine if the
report was true." 4 The government refused, asserting that such disclosure would
constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion" of the Iranian nationals' privacy under
FOIA Exemption 6.' Specifically, the State Department asserted that the
disclosure of its passport information would "cause a real threat of physical harm"
to both men. " 6 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled for the
106 Id. at 382.
07 Id. at 380 n.19 (citing H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 11 (1966); S. REP. No. 89-813, at 9
(1966)) (emphasis added).
'08 Id. at 372 (citations to internal quotation not in original). Justice Brennan said that
Congress intended for FOIA disputes involving Exemption 6 denials to be arbitrated by the
courts, and that Congress meant for the judiciary to "constrain agencies from withholding
non-exempt" information. Id. at 379-80 (citations omitted).
'09 456 U.S. 595 (1982).
" See Rose, 425 U.S. at 361.
..' Wash. Post, 456 U.S. at 600-01.
112 Id.
113 See id. at 596, 597 n.2.
114 Id. at 596.
115 Id. at 596 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)6).
116 Id. at 597 n.2. In an affidavit, the State Department stated:
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newspaper in favor of public disclosure.1 7 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit affirmed and held that the State Department did not prove that the passport
information qualified as "personnel," "medical," or "similar" records under the first
prong of Exemption 6. u' The court held that the passports did not contain "highly
personal" information or "intimate details" about the Iranian nationals." 9
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. 2 Writing for the Washington Post
Court, Rehnquist said Congress intended a broader construction of the "similar
files" clause in Exemption 6 than was applied by the appeals court below.' 2 '
Rehnquist wrote that a file does not need to contain intimate information to be
withheld under Exemption 6, but that an individual's citizenship documentation and
passport information was a sufficient privacy interest to trigger Exemption 6.
Rehnquist said Exemption 6 applies to both intimate and nonintimate personally-
identifiable information, including such things as "place of birth, date of birth, date
of marriage, employment history, and comparable data [that] is not normally
regarded as highly personal."'' 22 In dicta, Rehnquist said that even matters of public
record could trigger the first prong of Exemption 6.23 Rehnquist noted, however,
once the exemption is triggered, the government still has to prove that a disclosure
"would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" to justify
nondisclosure.'24 He said that Congress intended the "clearly unwarranted" clause
to limit nondisclosure under Exemption 6 despite the broad application of the
"similar files" clause. 2 5
Although the Court held that official citizenship information triggers the
"similar files" provision of Exemption 6,26 the Court did not decide whether
Any individual in Iran who is suspected of being an American citizen or having
American connections is looked upon with mistrust. An official of the
Government of Iran who is reputed to be an American Citizen would.., be in
physical danger from some of the revolutionary groups that are prone to
violence.
Id.
117 Id. at 597.
118 See Wash. Post Co., v. Dep't of State, 647 F.2d 197, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per
curiam).
"9 Id. at 198-99 (citing its ruling in Simpson v. Vance, 648 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1980) that
facts related to an individual's naturalization - which are similar to the information
contained in a passport - are nonexempt).
'21 See Wash. Post, 456 U.S. at 598.
121 Id. at 600.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 603 n.5 (stating that "[tihe public nature of information.., does not militate
against a conclusion that files are 'similar' to personnel and medical files").
124 Id. at 602.
12 Id. at 600.
126 Id.
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disclosure "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."127
The Washington Post Court remanded the case to the lower courts to consider the
"clearly unwarranted" issue because the courts below had avoided it. 28 Thus, the
Supreme Court did not explain what types of privacy interests would be covered by
Exemption 6 nor how lower courts should apply the "clearly unwarranted" standard
in terms of the actual privacy/access balance.'29
Still, it is significant that the Washington Post Court said that even
"nonintimate" personally-identifiable information could trigger the privacy balance
under Exemption 6.13° The Washington Post opinion directly affected FOIA policy.
In its official FOIA guidelines, the Justice Department said the Washington Post
opinion supported the conclusion that Exemption 6 is broadly triggered by "all
information that 'applies to a particular individual."" 3' On that point, the
Department concluded that Washington Post effectively overruled a "troublesome"
line of lower court rulings that had limited the Exemption 6 trigger to "'intimate'
personal details" and had not allowed the exemption to be triggered by personally-
identifiable information that did not meet that criterion. 32 As summed up by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a 1992 opinion, the Washington
Post opinion established that FOIA "requires only a measurable interest in privacy
to trigger" the balancing test under the privacy exemptions.'3 3
C. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee (1989)
In Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the
Supreme Court established the "central purpose" doctrine as a test in FOIA privacy
exemption cases for determining whether a FOIA-related public interest in access
exists. 134 In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court held that an individual's FBI
127 Id. at 602--03.
128 Id.
129 See Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government:
Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 455,
490 (1995) (discussing the critical issues left undecided after Washington Post).
"' See Wash. Post, 456 U.S. at 600-01 (noting that information that is "not normally
regarded as highly personal.., would be exempt from any disclosure that would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"). Regarding Exemption 6, Rehnquist
also wrote that "under the plain language of the exemption, nonintimate information about
a particular individual which happens to be contained in a personnel or medical file can be
withheld if its release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
Id. at 601.
' See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 47, at 326.
132 Id. at 325-27.
133 See FLRA v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 958 F.2d 503, 510 (2d Cir. 1992).
134 See Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 774
(1989).
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"rap sheet" - a computerized compilation of criminal arrests, charges and
convictions 3 ' - was categorically exempt from disclosure under Exemption
7(C). 13 6 Each FBI rap sheet contained information on an individual - often from
public sources - including "date of birth and physical characteristics, as well as a
history of arrests, charges, convictions, and incarcerations of the subject."' 13 7
Various local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies provided the FBI with
their criminal history information, which the FBI, in turn, included in a
computerized database that functions as an official clearinghouse for individual
criminal histories.'38 The FBI treated rap sheets as confidential, only to be released
to other government agencies for official purposes.'39
In Reporters Committee, the FBI had denied a FOIA request made by a CBS
reporter who asked for the rap sheet of an alleged organized-crime figure suspected
of corrupt business dealings with a congressman. 4 ° The reporter asked for the
FBI's rap sheet on Charles Medico, a businessman identified by the Pennsylvania
Crime Commission as an owner of a legitimate business associated with organized-
crime figures.' The CBS reporter was investigating Medico because his company
had received defense contracts allegedly in exchange for political contributions to
former Representative Daniel J. Flood.'4 2
In response to the request, the FBI released information on three of Medico's
brothers, all deceased.'43 However, the agency refused to release the rap sheet of
'3 See id. at 749.
136 See id. at 780.
Id. at 752. The FBI typically maintained rap sheets on subjects until they reached age
eighty. See id.
138 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 752, 761. The information typically was used by
various local, state and federal law enforcement agencies in the investigations and
prosecutions of crimes and by courts and corrections officials in the disposition of sentencing
and parole matters. See id. at 752.
9 See id. (noting that congressional legislation passed in 1957 that allowed the FBI to
cancel dissemination of rap sheets to any receiving agency that disseminated the information
to an unrelated third party). The Court noted that this policy was consistent with the policies
of most states that compiled criminal histories on subjects. Id. at 767.
140 Id. at 757.
41 See Al Kamen, High Court Backs Refusal to Release 'Rap Sheet' to News Media,
WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1989, at A4.
141 See id. Flood, who eventually resigned from the House on January 31, 1980, was
already under investigation for corruption at the time of the request. The Pennsylvania
Democrat left office while under indictment and plead guilty on February 26, 1980, to
conspiracy to violate federal campaign laws. He was convicted of conspiracy to solicit
campaign contributions from persons seeking federal government contracts and was placed
on probation for one year. He had earlier been tried on charges of bribery, perjury and
conspiracy. That trial ended with a hung jury in February 1979. See Laura Kiernan, Flood
Is Placed on Year's Probation, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1980, at A8.
"3 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 757.
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the living Medico brother.' Following the denial, the reporter sued for access but
the U.S. District Court for D.C. sided with the FBI and dismissed the suit on
summary judgment.'45 In doing so, the district judge said Medico's rap sheet
contained information that triggered the privacy provision of FOIA's law
enforcement exemption,'" and - before reviewing the rap sheet - concluded that
disclosure would be an unwarranted invasion of his personal privacy.'47 On appeal,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and ordered the district
judge to reconsider after conducting an in camera inspection of Medico's rap sheet
to see if its release was unreasonable and unwarranted.'48 The appeals court
reasoned that the government could not likely sustain such a privacy claim based
on records that comprised criminal records that were publicly available from the
reporting agencies themselves.'49
On appeal, the Supreme Court said the sole issue was whether public disclosure
of computerized FBI rap sheets "could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" under Exemption 7(C). 5 ' In ruling on
that issue, the Reporters Committee Court first said FBI rap sheets implicated a
FOIA-related privacy interest under Exemption 7(C). 5' The Court therefore
concluded that the request for Medico's FBI rap sheet indeed triggered the privacy
protection of Exemption 7(C)."2
Writing for the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens concluded that informational
privacy had been defined in common law as an individual's right to control private
information that pertains to him or her.' In order to draw a line between private
and nonprivate information, Justice Stevens quoted a standard dictionary definition
and wrote that information is "private" when it is "intended for or restricted to the
'" See id.
"'s See Reporters Comm. v. Dep't of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
'46 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)7(C) (2000) (stating that records collected for "law enforcement
purposes" are exempt from disclosure if their release "could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy").
147 See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 757-59.
4' Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d at 742.
"49 Id. at 740.
"o Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 751 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)7(C) (1982 & Supp. V
1987)).
' See id. at 762. The Court pointed out that the privacy interest implicated was not
constitutional-based or grounded in tort concepts of privacy. See id. at 762, 762 n. 13, 763.
The Court stated: "The question of the statutory meaning of privacy under FOIA is, of
course, not the same as the question whether a tort action might lie for invasion of privacy
or the question whether an individual's interest in privacy is protected by the Constitution."
Id. at 762 n.13.
152 Id. at 774-75 (stating that the public may have an interest in the release of the rap
sheet, but that interest is not the type protected by FOIA).
' Id. at 763.
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use of a particular person or group or class of persons[;] not freely available to the
public."'54 Based on this definition, the Court held categorically that an individual
would always have a strong FOIA-based privacy interest in his or her FBI rap sheet
under Exemption 7(C). 55
The requesters argued against such a conclusion and pointed out that most of
the information in Medico's as well as most other FBI rap sheets, came from
publicly available records such as arrest records in which no privacy interest should
attach.'56 Calling this interpretation a "cramped notion of personal privacy,"' 15 7
Stevens said, "Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records that
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local
police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a
single clearinghouse of information."'5 8
Because the Reporters Committee Court found a FOIA-based privacy interest
at stake, it was necessary to proceed with balancing that interest against the public
interest in access and disclosure.'5 On that point, the Reporters Committee Court
ruled that the only FOIA-related interest in disclosing private information is to
inform the public about government operations and activities. 6 ° Writing for the
Court, Stevens said that FOIA' s "central purpose is to ensure that the Government's
activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about
private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the Government be so
disclosed."''
The Reporters Committee Court ruled categorically that an individual's
computerized rap sheet would not directly reveal government operations or
performance and, thus, would lie "outside the ambit of the public interest that FOIA
Id. at 763-64 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1804 (1976)).
I5 d. at 780. The Court concluded that a categorical balancing approach under Exemption
7(C) was proper for an "appropriate class of law enforcement records or information" such'
as FBI rap sheets. Id. at 777. The Court said that a categorical balancing approach, as
opposed to an ad hoc or case-by-case approach, would lead to expedited FOIA disclosure
decisions. See id. at 779 (citing FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1983)).
156 See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762-63.
I5 /d. at 763.
I58 d. at 764. The Court pointed out that there is a "distinction, in terms of personal
privacy, between scattered disclosure of the bits of information contained in a rap sheet and
revelation of the rap sheet as a whole." Id. Each FBI rap sheet was a "compilation of
otherwise hard-to-obtain information" that required federal resources to prepare, and thus,
the rap sheet information was not "freely available" to the public or to public officials. See
id.
'" See id. at 776 (noting that the parties in the case agreed that a- Rose balance was
appropriate, but disagreed on how that balance should be implemented).
's See id. at 772-73.
I61 ld.at 774.
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was enacted to serve. 162 In other words, according to the Reporters Committee
Court, disclosing an individual's FBI rap sheet always would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of privacy because it would not directly illuminate
government activity. "I When the Court applied its newly-created "central purpose"
test"M to Medico's rap sheet, the Court concluded that disclosure would not reveal
anything directly about the behavior of the congressman who allegedly had
improper dealings with Medico, 65 or anything about how the Department of
Defense had awarded contracts to Medico's company.1
66
Using the "central purpose" doctrine, the Reporters Committee Court
established a "bright line" rule that there was no FOIA-based public interest in
disclosing a private citizen's FBI rap sheet. 167 Stevens wrote that disclosure of "law
enforcement records or information about a private citizen" would always be
"unwarranted" when the requested information reveals no official agency action.168
In other words, the requested information is not a record of "what the government
is up to.' 169 The opinion is therefore significant for rejecting a "cramped"
interpretation of individual privacy while using a narrow interpretation of FOIA-
related interest in disclosure.
D. Impact of Rose, Washington Post, and Reporters Committee
Viewed together, the Washington Post and Reporters Committee opinions have
made a profound impact on constricting the boundaries of disclosure under FOIA
in privacy cases, and have gone a long way toward skewing the Rose balancing test
in a manner that favored withholding over disclosure.'
In Rose, the Court emphasized that in FOIA privacy-exemption cases, the public
interest in disclosure should be weighed against the individual privacy interests in
determining whether privacy can be raised to block public access to records
otherwise subject to disclosure.17' The first Court-crafted obstacle to disclosure was
162 Id. at 775.
163 Id. at 774-75.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 774.
'" Stevens wrote that information about Medico's criminal history "would neither
aggravate nor mitigate his allegedly improper relationship with [a member of Congress]" and
"would tell us nothing directly about the character of the Congressman's behavior" nor
"anything about the conduct of the Department of Defense.. .in awarding... contracts to
[Medico's company]." Id.
167 See id. at 779-80.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 780.
170 Arguably, this was not the intent of the Rose Court as indicated by the majority opinion
by Justice Brennan. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
171 Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); see also infra notes 336-38 and
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set forth in Washington Post, when the Court held that even a minimal privacy
interest is sufficient to trigger FOIA privacy exemptions. 172 Later, the Reporters
Committee Court laid out the "central purpose" doctrine, which drastically limited
the FOLA-related public interest in disclosure once one of the privacy exemptions
was triggered. '73 Thus, after Reporters Committee, what remained was a balancing
framework that significantly departed from the Rose Court's standard, replacing it
with one that broadly interprets the privacy interests in withholding records while
severely constricting the concept of FOIA-related public interests in disclosure.'74
None of these cases, however, directly addressed the issues of whether courts
deciding FOIA privacy exemption cases should consider derivative uses of
information and secondary effects of disclosure when balancing the public interest
in disclosure and the individual privacy interest in nondisclosure.
However, in these cases the Court seemed to implicitly favor an approach that
weighs derivative uses and secondary effects on the privacy side of the balance and
not the access side. In Rose, the Court said the requested Air Force disciplinary
summaries implicated FOIA-related "privacy values" because the "identification of
disciplined cadets . . . could expose the formerly accused men to lifelong
embarrassment, perhaps disgrace, as well as practical disabilities, such as loss of
employment or friends."' 75 Writing for the Rose majority, Brennan said the privacy
issue had to be analyzed from the "vantage" of the cadets' colleagues and not just
from the "viewpoint of the [general] public."' 76 The Rose majority said the trial
court should not allow release of the summaries if redaction would not sufficiently
"safeguard privacy." 77 Thus, the Court, at least implicitly, condoned consideration
of derivative uses and secondary effects when considering the privacy interest of the
cadets.
Similarly, in the Washington Post opinion in 1982, the Court seemed to suggest
that secondary effects of disclosure were relevant on the privacy side of the balance.
Rehnquist wrote in that case that Congress intended Exemption 6 to protect people
accompanying text.
17 See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
7 See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772-73.
174 See id.
... Rose, 425 U.S. at 376-77 (quoting Rose v. Dep't of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 267
(2d Cir. 1974)).
' Id. at 380. The Supreme Court said the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York could consider the Air Force Academy tradition of keeping confidential within
the Academy the identities of cadets who are subject to ethics and honors proceedings. See
id. Still, the Court said the "risk to the privacy interests of a former cadet, particularly one
who has remained in the military, posed by his identification by otherwise unknowing former
colleagues or instructors cannot be rejected as trivial." Id. at 381.
"' Id. at 381 (quoting from the court of appeals opinion in Rose v. Dep't of the Air Force,
495 F.2d 261, 268 (2d Cir. 1974)).
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from "the injury and embarrassment that can result from the unnecessary disclosure
of personal information." ' The majority instructed the lower court on remand to
consider the "effect of disclosure" on the privacy interests of the Iranian nationals
whose citizenship information had been requested.'79 The Court still had not
explicitly endorsed or rejected consideration of derivative uses and secondary
effects on either side of the balance, but seemed to have again endorsed it on the
privacy side.
In 1989, the Reporters Committee Court likewise suggested that secondary
effects of disclosure should not be considered when weighing the public interest in
access and disclosure.' The Court refused to compel disclosure of reputed crime
figure Charles Medico's FBI rap sheet to a reporter investigating whether Medico's
company had been awarded government contracts based on corrupt dealings with
a congressman. Writing for the Reporters Committee majority, Stevens concluded
that Medico's criminal history "would tell us nothing directly about the character"
of the corrupt congressman's behavior, nor "anything about the conduct" of the
Department of Defense in awarding one or more contracts to Medico's company.'
81
The Court indicated that a FOIA-related public interest in an activity of the
government - as defined by the central-purpose doctrine - must be evident on the
face of the requested documents in a privacy exemption case. 82
In this series of three decisions, the Supreme Court arguably ratified - without
explicitly addressing the issues of derivative uses and secondary effects - an
approach that weighs derivative uses and secondary effects on the privacy side of
the FOIA balance but not on the public access side.
83
IL. DERIVATIVE USES AND SECONDARY EFFECTS OF DISCLOSURE: THE RAY CASE
(1991)
Department of State v. Ray," is a 1991 Supreme Court opinion that stands as
the only FOIA privacy exemption case to date in which the Court explicitly
acknowledged it was engaging in an analysis based on derivative uses and
secondary effects. 85 In practice, however, the Court had applied precisely such an
analysis in its three previous FOIA privacy cases - consistently on the privacy side
78 Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982) (emphasis added).
179 See id. at 602-03.
180 See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774; see also Sinrod, supra note 26, at 221-22
(noting that the Reporters Committee majority did not consider derivative uses on the public-
interest side of the balance).
181 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774 (emphasis added).
'82 See id. at 774, 779-80.
183 See Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991).
184 Id.
1 5 Id.
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of the balance: In Department of the Air Force v. Rose,'86 the Court considered the
potential effects of cadets being stigmatized if it were disclosed they cheated; in
Department of State v. Washington Post,'87 the Court considered the speculative
harm that might have befallen the two Iranian officials whose U.S. passport
information was requested; and in Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press,8' the Court noted that comprehensive FBI rap sheets
contained records of arrests that never led to indictments, charges that were
dropped, and trials that resulted in acquittals, and thus could be prejudicial.
Ray involved a request for the identities of Haitian refugees who had fled to the
United States, but were later deported to Haiti. 8 9 The Court's decision in Ray
remains the only opinion to date that explicitly addresses the derivative uses
issue.' 90 In Ray, a unanimous Supreme Court held that Exemption 6 prohibited
disclosure of the identities of Haitian refugees who had been intercepted at sea,
denied political asylum, and returned to Haiti against their will by the U.S.
government. ' Relying on the central-purpose doctrine from Reporters Committee,
the Court concluded that mere disclosure of the refugees' identities would not shed
light on official agency action.'92 Furthermore, the Ray Court explicitly declined
to decide the derivative uses and secondary effects issue on the public-interest side
of the balance even though it considered secondary effects of disclosure on the
privacy side."'
In Ray, the FOIA requester was a lawyer representing undocumented Haitian
immigrants in Florida seeking political asylum in the United States. In immigration
proceedings, the lawyer alleged that the Haitian government would retaliate against
his clients if they were deported and returned there.'94 The State Department
claimed these fears were unfounded because it had obtained a promise by the
Haitian government to not prosecute or harass returnees. '95
The State Department said it had monitored Haitian compliance for more than
three years by interviewing returnees after their return to Haiti. '96 To verify this, the
186 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
187 456 U.S. 595 (1982).
'8 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
189 See Ray, 502 U.S. at 164.
'"9 Id. For a detailed discussion of the Ray case, including its factual background and U.S.
interdiction policy, see generally Zimmerman, supra note 77.
'' Ray, 502 U.S. at 170-71, 179.
192 Id. at 177-79.
193 Id.
194 See id. at 168.
' Id. at 167-68.
196 Id. at 168-69. The State Department claimed it had interviewed more than 1,000
returnees, which it said represented almost twenty-five percent of the total number of
returnees. Id. at 169 n.4. The State Department said that only two of the interviewed
returnees reported any mistreatment, and it did not consider either report serious. Id. at 168.
2003]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
immigrants' lawyer filed a FOIA request for official documentation on the State
Department's monitoring efforts, including interview transcripts. The State
Department, which had promised the interviewees confidentiality to protect them
from retaliation by the Haitian government, produced a summary of its interviews
and findings, with all identifying information redacted.'97 The lawyer sued in
federal district court in Florida seeking release of the redacted information so that
he could check the veracity of the State Department summaries with his own
follow-up interviews.'98
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida ordered production
of the redacted information and ruled that the public interest in the "safe relocation
of returned Haitians" outweighed any invasion of the personal privacy arising from
the "mere act of disclosure of names and addresses.""' The judge characterized the
privacy interest as speculative and de minimis.2 °° On appeal, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, but rejected the district court's
characterization of the privacy interest as de minimis.
20 1
The Eleventh Circuit said the Haitian returnees had "significant privacy
interests at stake" because the State Department had promised them anonymity and
the requester admittedly intended to contact them. 22 However, the appeals court
ruled in favor of access to the requested information based on what it called a
"weightier public interest" in knowing whether the U.S. government was adequately
monitoring the Haitian government and truthfully reporting these efforts.23 Using
a derivative-uses analysis on the public interest side, the appeals court said the
redacted information would provide the means to locate returnees and conduct
204interviews.
However, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens, reversed
the Eleventh Circuit and ruled that disclosure of the redacted information "would
19 See id. at 168-69.
'98 Ray v. Dep't of Justice, 725 F. Supp. 502 (S.D.Fla. 1989).
199 Id. at 505.
200 Id.
201 See Ray v. Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 1549, 1554-55 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
202 See id. at 1554.
203 See id. at 1555. The Eleventh Circuit wrote:
However, the [requesters] ... seek the information in order to learn whether the
United States government is adequately monitoring Haiti's compliance with its
obligation not to persecute returnees and to learn whether our government is
honest to the public about Haiti's treatment of returnees. They dispute the view
expressed publicly by some government officials that Haiti is adhering to its
promise not to punish returnees, and they seek information that will assist them
in testing the accuracy of that information. We consider these to be matters of
great public interest significant enough to outweigh the privacy interests of the
Haitian returnees.
204 See id. at 1555-56.
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constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" under Exemption
6.2"5 The Court said the privacy interest in nondisclosure was compelling because
the requester intended to contact the refugees, and disclosure of their names might
lead to their embarrassment and to official retaliation against them by the Haitian
government. 26 Stevens wrote: "How significant the danger of mistreatment may
now be is, of course, impossible to measure, but the privacy interest in protecting
these individuals from any retaliatory action that might result from a renewed
interest in their aborted attempt to emigrate must be given great weight." 207 Stevens
thus seemed willing to give "great weight" to the privacy interest in nondisclosure
based on speculation about potential derivative uses and secondary effects of
disclosure. On the other hand, when it came to considering uses and effects on the
public interest side of the balance - i.e., the potential harms that may befall the
Haitians if the government's claims are not confirmed - the Court sidestepped the
issue by stating, "Mere speculation about hypothetical public benefits cannot
outweigh a demonstrably significant invasion of privacy. Accordingly, we need not
address the question whether a 'derivative use' theory would ever justify release of
information about private individuals.""2 8
In weighing the public interest in disclosure, the Ray Court reiterated the
central-purpose doctrine from Reporters Committee and said public scrutiny of
official agency action was the only FOIA-based consideration on that count.2" The
Court agreed with the requester that determining whether the State Department had
adequately monitored the Haitian government's treatment of returnees was indeed
a FOIA-related public interest. However, the Court concluded that the redacted
summaries were sufficiently adequate for that purpose. 10 Stevens said that
releasing the names of the refugees would not provide additional information about
State Department actions and, therefore, met the "clearly unwarranted" standard of
Exemption 6.2"
205 Ray, 502 U.S. at 170-71, 173.
206 Id. at 175-77, 179. The Court also relied on the government's promise not to identify
the interviewees and said that disclosure would publicly identify the returnees - now living
in Haiti - as having cooperated with a foreign government in monitoring efforts aimed at
their own government. Id. at 176.
207 Id. at 176-77 (emphasis added) ("[Disclosure] would publicly identify the interviewees
as people who cooperated with a State Department investigation of the Haitian Government's
compliance with its promise to the United States Government not to persecute the
returnees.").
208 See id. at 179.
209 See id. at 178 (citing Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)) (quoting Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61
(1976)).
210 See id. at 178.
211 See id.
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The Ray majority explicitly acknowledged FOIA requester's derivative-uses
argument on the public-interest side of the balance.1 2 Stevens pointed out that the
requester was trying to establish a FOIA-related public interest based on the "hope"
that the redacted information could be used as a link to discover information beyond
the official summaries, primarily through follow-up interviews with the refugees
named in the records."z 3 However, he characterized this potential public benefit as
"hypothetical" and insufficient to outweigh the refugees' privacy interests in
nondisclosure.214 Stevens said there was no evidence to suggest that additional
interviews would yield relevant information beyond the State Department
summaries."15 Furthermore, Stevens said there was no evidence that cast doubt on
the validity of the summaries themselves.2 6 On the latter point, he wrote:
We generally accord Government records and official conduct a
presumption of legitimacy. If a totally unsupported suggestion that the
interest in finding out whether Government agents have been telling the
truth justified disclosure of private materials, Government agencies
would have no defense against requests for production of private
information. What sort of evidence of official misconduct might be
sufficient to identify a genuine public interest in disclosure is a matter
that we need not address in this case. 17
The Court thus created a rebuttable presumption of legitimacy in the requested
records, meaning that the records are presumed to be accurate and correct. In other
words, if, according to the records, U.S. officials said Haitians were interviewed to
make sure they were not harassed by the Haitian government, then there is no
FOLA-related public interest in the records for the purpose of confirming the U.S.
government's statements; the records are presumptively legitimate, barring evidence
to the contrary. The Court did not, however, provide guidance on the amount or type
of evidence a requester would need to show in order to overcome that presumption.
The government had urged the Ray Court to categorically ban consideration of
derivative uses when weighing the public interest in disclosure.2 8 The majority
212 Id.
213 id.
214 Ray, 502 U.S. at 179.
215 See id. at 178-79.
216 See id. at 179 ("We are also unmoved by respondents' asserted interest in ascertaining
the veracity of the interview reports. There is not a scintilla of evidence either in the
documents themselves or elsewhere in the record, that tends to impugn the integrity of the
reports.").
217 Id. (emphasis added).
218 Id. at 178. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia said the derivative-use issue had
been "vigorously disputed" by the parties. See id. at 180 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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refused and found such a "rigid rule" unnecessary under the facts of the case. 219 In
a concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia disagreed on this point, and said the
Court should have banned consideration of derivative uses when weighing either
the public interest in disclosure or the individual privacy interest in secrecy.22°
Justice Scalia pointed out that the Ray majority had in fact considered
derivative uses and secondary effects on the privacy side of the balance while
explicitly refusing to do the same on the public-interest side, and he criticized this
approach, as have subsequent commentators.22" ' Scalia said that in weighing the
refugees' privacy interests, the majority had explicitly considered the possibility
that disclosure would bring additional contacts upon the returnees, including
interview attempts by lawyers and retaliatory actions by the Haitian government.
2 2
Scalia concluded that such speculation on the privacy side was unnecessary because
the redacted information was inherently private on its face.223 He wrote:
[Elach of the unredacted documents requested.., would disclose that
a particular person had agreed, under a pledge of confidentiality, to
report to a foreign power concerning the conduct of his own government.
This is information that a person would ordinarily not wish to be known
about himself - and thus constitutes an invasion of personal privacy.224
On the public-interest side, Scalia agreed with the majority that disclosure of
the redacted names would not further illuminate official State Department activity.
He said there was "nothing" on the public-interest side in support of access225 and,
211 Id. at 178-79.
220 Id. at 179-82 (emphasis added) (Scalia, J., concurring). Eric J. Sinrod, the lawyer for
FOIA requesters in Ray, subsequently criticized such a categorical rule as creating an
"irrebuttable presumption of nondisclosure." See Sinrod, supra note 26, at 229-31. He
argued that courts should consider derivative uses and secondary effects when evaluating
both the individual privacy interest in nondisclosure and the public interest in access. See
id. at 227-31.
121 See id. at 502 U.S. at 181 ("Since derivative use on the public-benefits side, and
derivative use on the personal-privacy side must surely go together (there is no plausible
reason to allow it for the one and bar it for the other), the [majority] should have been
consistent"); see also Amy McDonald, Case Comment, 26 SUIFOLKU.L.REv. 201,208,208
n.38 (1992) (noting the Ray majority's use of the derivative-use analysis on the privacy side
and not the public-interest side and Scalia's concurrence in this regard); Sinrod, supra note
26, at 226 (noting by counsel for FOIA requesters in Ray, the majority's inconsistent
consideration of derivative uses).
222 See Ray, 502 U.S. at 177-79.
223 Id. at 181.
24 Id. (comparing Wash. Post, 456 U.S. at 595).
225 Id.; see also Christopher P. Beall, Note, The Exaltation of Privacy Doctrines over
Public Information Law, 45 Duke L.J. 1249, 1260-61 (1996) (stating that the Ray majority
effectively precluded consideration of derivative uses on the public interest side by refusing
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therefore, disclosure was "clearly unwarranted. 2 6
The Ray opinion is significant for several reasons. First, it reaffirmed the
Court's commitment to the central-purpose doctrine from Reporters Committee.
Second, the Ray Court recognized the important role of derivative uses and
secondary effects when balancing access and privacy interests. However, the
opinion left undecided the issue of what kind of evidence would be sufficient to
invoke a derivative-use analysis when weighing the public interest in access. At a
minimum, the opinion suggests that unsupported assertions and speculation about
public benefits of disclosure are insufficient. In his Ray concurrence, Scalia
concluded that the majority had placed a great deal of weight in speculative
scenarios when evaluating the refugees' privacy interests.227 Third, the Ray opinion
created an unprecedented "presumption of legitimacy" for requested government
records in FOIA privacy-exemption cases.2 Arguably, such a presumption places
a substantial burden on FOIA requesters to proffer evidence that will demonstrate
a convincing need to investigate or verify government action. But the Ray Court did
not describe the type or amount of evidence that is sufficient to rebut the
presumption of legitimacy for government records.229 This issue remains
unresolved.
IV. SUBSEQUENT PRIVACY EXEMPTION CASES
Since issuing the Ray opinion, the Supreme Court has decided two FOIA
privacy-exemption cases: Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority (FLRA)230 in 1994, and Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Association"'
to consider the purpose for which the request for the information had been made).
226 See 502 U.S. at 181-82.
227 See id. at 177-79.
2.8 See id. at 179.
229 In this regard, the Ray opinion has been criticized for giving federal agencies too much
discretion to withhold significant information from the public. See Zimmerman, supra note
77, at 414 ('The Ray opinion represents a considerable amount of deference toward the
United States Govermnent's interest in nondisclosure of significant information") (citation
omitted). More specifically, the opinion has been criticized for deflating the whole idea of
open government by creating a "'presumption of legitimacy' concerning the veracity of
government reports" that has the "potential to further distort the balancing process mandated
under Exemption 6." Id. at 414-15 (citation omitted).
230 510 U.S. 487 (1994). For a discussion of this case and the history of the conflict among
the federal appellate courts leading up to the decision, see William F. Kullman, Right of
Privacy: Whether the Public Interest in Collective Bargaining Outweighs Federal
Employees' Privacy Interests in Their Homes and Occupations, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 343
(1993).
231 519 U.S. 355 (1997). At the time of this article, the Supreme Court was scheduled to
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in 1997. Both the FLRA and Bibles opinions reiterate the Court's steadfast
commitment to the central-purpose doctrine in FOIA privacy-exemptions cases.
These cases also reflect the Court's implicit consideration of derivative uses and
secondary effects of disclosure when considering individual privacy interests in
nondisclosure.
A. Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) (1994)
In Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority,232 the Supreme
Court held in 1994 that disclosure of federal employees' home addresses to labor
unions that wanted to send them direct mail would constitute a "clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy" under Exemption 6.233 In doing so, the FLRA Court,
in effect, followed the approach of the Ray majority and considered derivative uses
and secondary effects of disclosure on the privacy side, but not on the access side
of the balance.
The case arose when two labor unions asked federal agencies to produce names
and addresses for agency employees in bargaining units represented by the
unions.13 1 In response, the agencies produced names and work locations, but not
home addresses. The unions already had the home addresses of its members and of
nonunion employees who had volunteered information to union representatives.
The focus of the dispute became the home addresses of nonunion employees who
had not given their home addresses to union representatives.235
The unions filed a complaint with the FLRA, which governs union-employer
relations, and the FLRA ordered disclosure. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit also ordered disclosure concluding that the "public interest in
collective bargaining outweigh[ed] the employees' private interest in nondisclosure
hear oral arguments in an Exemption 7(C) case involving a FOIA request for the death scene
photographs of Vincent J. Foster, who at the time of his death in 1993, was Deputy Counsel
to President Bill Clinton. See Office of Indep. Counsel v. Favish, 2003 WL 2011010 (U.S.
May 5, 2003). In addition, the Court had agreed to review another Exemption 7(C) case
involving a city's FOIA request for information in federal weapons databases. See Dep't of
Treasury v. City of Chicago, 537 U.S. 1018 (2002). However, the Supreme Court
subsequently decided not to hear the case and instead remanded it to the lower court for
further consideration in light of pending congressional legislation. See Dep't of Justice v.
City of Chicago, 123 S.Ct. 1352 (2003). At the time of this article, the case remained pending
on remand.
232 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
233 Id. at 489.
234 See id. at 491. The agencies involved in the request were the Department of Defense,
Department of the Navy, Navy CBC Exchange, Construction Battalion Center in Gulfport,
Mississippi, and the Department of Defense, Army and Air Force Exchange, Dallas, Texas.
Id. at n.2.
135 See id. at 490, 495 n.5.
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of their names and addresses." '236 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that while disclosure
might lead to additional mailings to the employees, the impact on their privacy
would be insignificant because they could simply place unwanted mailings in the
so-called "circular file. 2 37 The court noted that individuals commonly have their
names listed in telephone directories and commercial mailing lists.
2 31
The Supreme Court reversed on appeal. Writing for the majority, Justice
Clarence Thomas said the sole issue was "whether disclosure of the home addresses
'would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' under
Exemption 6 of FOIA.23 9 Thomas restated the composite framework from Rose and
Reporters Committee as requiring a balance between the public interest in
disclosure - as defined by the central-purpose doctrine - and the privacy interest
in nondisclosure, without considering the requester's identity or intended
purpose.24 Within this framework, the FLRA Court first considered whether there
was a "FOIA-related public interest" in disclosure of the employees' addresses.'
Writing for the Court, Thomas said disclosure would not sufficiently illuminate
official agency actions,2 42 and that any FOIA-related public interest in access was
thus "negligible '2 43 and "virtually nonexistent."2" Thomas acknowledged that
disclosure would provide a means for labor unions to communicate by direct mail
with nonunion employees, but rejected this as a FOIA-related public interest under
the central-purpose doctrine.245
236 See Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v. Dep't of Def., 975 F.2d 1105, 1116 (5th Cir. 1992).
For law review case comment treatment of the opinion of the Fifth Circuit, see generally Karl
J. Sanders, Casenote, FOIA v. Federal Sector Labor Law: Which "Public Interest" Prevails?
62 U. CiN. L. REv. 787 (1993).
237 See FLRA, 975 F.2d at 1110-11 (quoting Dep't of the Air Force v. FLRA, 838 F.2d
229, 232 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 880 (1988)).
238 Id.
239 FLRA, 510 U.S. at 494-95. Actually, the exemption issue in FLRA was more
complicated than is necessary to discuss in the text. The agencies argued for nondisclosure
under the provisions of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1988), which prohibits
federal agencies from disclosing information about an individual absent his or her written
consent. However, the Court noted the Privacy Act by its terms does not apply to
information that must be disclosed under FOIA. Id. at 493-95. The Court noted that FOIA
had its own privacy exemptions that apply to FOIA information, leading to the necessity of
a privacy analysis under those exemptions, not the Privacy Act. The Court chided Congress
for creating this "convoluted path of statutory references." Id. at 494-95.
240 Id. at 495-96 (citing Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 771, 773, 776 (1989); Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372
(1976)) (citations omitted).
241 Id. at 497-500.
242 FLRA, 510 U.S. at 498-99.
243 Id. at 497.
244 Id. at 500.
245 Id. at 498-99.
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With practically no weight given to the public interest side of the balance, the
Court said that even a "very slight" or "not insubstantial" privacy interest would be
sufficient to warrant nondisclosure.2" Thomas said employees who had neither
opted to join a union nor provided information to union representatives had at least
a "nontrivial privacy interest in nondisclosure."2 47  Using derivative-uses and
secondary-effects language, Thomas said employees had an interest in "avoiding the
influx of union-related mail, and, perhaps, union-related telephone calls or visits,
that would follow disclosure. ' 24 ' He said it was irrelevant that most addresses are
available in public sources such as telephone directories and voter registration
records.249 Invoking the rationale from Reporters Committee, Thomas wrote: "The
privacy interest protected by Exemption 6 'encompasses the individual's control of
information concerning his or her person.' An individual's interest in controlling
the dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not dissolve
simply because that information may be available to the public in some form. 2
50
Thus, by framing FOIA-related privacy interest in this fashion - as a right of
individuals to control how their personal information is used - the Court
considered derivative uses on the privacy side of the balance when weighing this
right against disclosure in FOIA privacy-exemption cases.'
A University of Cincinnati casenote suggested that the facts of the FLRA case
made for an especially strong argument in favor of considering derivative uses and
secondary effects on the public-interest side of the balance." 2 The author
24" Id. at 500.
247 Id. at 501.
48 Id. at 501. Thomas speculated: "Perhaps some of these individuals have failed to join
the union that represents them due to lack of familiarity with the union of its services. Others
may be opposed to their union or to unionism in general on practical or ideological grounds."
Id. at 500.
249 Id. at 500.
250 Id. (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763) (emphasis added).
251 In a concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg disagreed with the majority and
argued that indeed there was a direct governing interest in the disclosure of union members'
contact information because the FLRA had mandated that private-sector unions have access
to employee addresses and phone numbers. See FLRA, 510 U.S. at 506 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). Ginsburg observed that Congress recognized a significant public interest in
furthering collective bargaining when it enacted the Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations statute, which "unquestionably intended to strengthen the position of federal
unions." Id. at 506 (quoting Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Fed. Labor Relations
Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 107 (1983)). Noting that lower courts have held that private-sector
unions are entitled to receive employee home-address lists from employers, she thus
reasoned: "It is surely doubtful that, in the very statute bolstering federal-sector unions,
Congress aimed to deny those unions information their private-sector counterparts routinely
receive." FLRA, 510 U.S. at 506 (Ginsburg, I., concurring) (citing Fed. Labor Relations
Auth. v. Dep't of Treasury, Fin. Mgmt. Serv., 884 F.2d 1446, 1457-61 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
252 See Sanders, supra note 236, at 815-16.
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postulated that union contact with nonunion federal employees outside the
workplace "would likely produce more candid discussions about employer-
employee relations," and would facilitate an examination of government operations
within the scope of the central-purpose doctrine.253 Thus, he concluded that the
derivative-uses analysis was "particularly well-suited" to evaluate the public interest
in disclosure of the requested names and addresses in FLRA.254 In a case decided
by the Supreme Court in 1997, the Court had the opportunity to take such an
approach, but flatly refused and chastised the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit for doing so.
B. Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n (1997)
In 1997, the Supreme Court continued the trend of deciding derivative-uses
issues in favor of privacy in FOIA privacy-exemption cases. In Bibles v. Oregon
Natural Desert Association,55 the Supreme Court decisively reaffirmed its FLRA
ruling and the central-purpose doctrine from Reporters Committee. The Court
reversed the decision by the Ninth Circuit, which had held that Exemption 6 did not
preclude disclosure of a mailing list used by the Oregon office of the U.S. Bureau
of Land Management (BLM).256 The Oregon Natural Desert Association (ONDA),
a nonprofit environmental group, had made a FOIA request for the mailing list in
order to send its own literature to individuals who received mailings from the BLM
about government plans for the future of the Oregon high desert.257 The
environmental group described the BLM's literature as antienvironmental
"propaganda. ' 25 ' After the BLM refused the request on Exemption 6 grounds,
ONDA brought a FOIA suit in federal district court in Oregon, and the district judge
ordered disclosure. 259
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Invoking derivative-uses language, the Ninth
Circuit concluded there was a "substantial public interest in knowing to whom the
government is directing information on public issues" so that groups with other
viewpoints could communicate with those individuals as well.2 6' The court
reasoned this would act as a check on the "self-interest" of government agencies in
" Id. at 814 (citations omitted).
254 Id. at 815.
5 Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355, 356 (1997) (per curiam).
256 See Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. Bibles, 83 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 1996).
27 Id. at 1169.
258 Id. at 1169-70, 1171.
259 Id. at 1169-70. The proceedings below also included an appeal by the ONDA to the
U.S. Department of the Interior. The Department had affirmed the denial by BLM as to the
names and addresses of private individuals, but ordered BLM to produce the names of
organizations on its mailing list. This then prompted FOIA lawsuit by the ONDA. See id.
260 Id. at 1171.
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presenting themselves only favorably.26 ' On the privacy side, the Ninth Circuit also
considered derivative uses and secondary effects, and found only a "minimal"
privacy interest in nondisclosure.262 In doing so, the court pointed out that
individuals on the BLM mailing list already had indicated their desire to receive
mailings on the issues that ONDA wanted to address.263 As the districtjudge below
had stated, these individuals "have already opened up their mailboxes to the receipt
of information about BLM activities." 2" Based on this analysis, the appeals court
concluded that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the privacy interest in
nondisclosure.
65
In his dissent, Ninth Circuit Judge Fernandez said the majority had "practically
ignore[d]" the Supreme Court's holdings in Reporters Committee and FLRA. 66
Fernandez said the majority was allowing "curiosity and gain to trump privacy. "267
He said that ONDA wanted the BLM mailing list to contact individuals on the list,
and concluded that this would not sufficiently illuminate agency action under the
central-purpose doctrine.268 In addition, he said the BLM list was valuable to
ONDA because it contained the names and addresses of individuals who had
expressed an interest in environmental land issues and thus were likely prospects
261 Id.
262 Id. at 1171-72 (citing Dep't of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 501
(1994)) (noting that the Supreme Court in FLRA had characterized the privacy interest
involved in the receipt of unsolicited mailings as merely "nontrivial"). The Ninth Circuit
distinguished the facts in FLRA, noting disclosure of federal employees' names and addresses
in that case might have resulted in their being contacted at home, in person, or by union
representatives recruiting for members, which it said was not an issue under the facts in
Bibles. Id. at 1172 ("[R]ecipients of BLM news are unlikely to be targeted for the same type
of aggressive, high-stakes personal contact that the [Supreme] Court was wary of in
[FLRA].").
263 Id.
264 Id. at 1170 (quoting the federal district judge below).
265 Id. at 1172 (stating that "[b]ecause the privacy interests at stake are minimal, and
because there is a significant public interest in knowing with whom the government has
chosen to communicate and in providing those persons with additional information, we
conclude disclosure would not result in a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy under
Exemption 6").
26 Id. at 1172 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
267 id.
268 Id. Judge Fernandez wrote:
That the BLM is sending out mailers is a fact well known, and if any person
wishes to know what is in the mailers he need only ask for them. However, it
tells us nothing about government when we discover that the mailer went to John
Doe in New York or Billy Rowe in Los Angeles. ONDA does not really want to
check on the government; it wants to contact the people on the list.
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for ONDA to target with its own mailings.2 69 He said that the individuals on the
BLM list had a privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of their interests.27 °
In a two-paragraph per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed and flatly
rejected the Ninth Circuit's characterization of the public interest in disclosure of
the BLM mailing list. Summarizing from FLRA and Reporters Committee, the
Court reiterated that illuminating government action was the only FOIA-related
public interest to be considered in FOIA privacy-exemption cases,27 ' and that the
identity and purpose of the requester must be ignored in the balancing analysis.272
The Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had deviated from these principles by
finding a FOIA-related public interest in providing alternative viewpoints to
recipients of official government propaganda, and by considering the intent of the
ONDA to use the BLM mailing list for that purpose.273
In Bibles, the Supreme Court did not address the privacy analysis of the Ninth
Circuit. As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit had called the privacy interest in
nondisclosure of the BLM mailing list "minimal." '274 In doing so, the appeals court
clearly used a derivative-uses analysis and considered the ONDA's intent to send
mailings to individuals on the BLM mailing list. Because the Supreme Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit's public interest analysis and left that side of the balance
devoid of weight, even such a minimal privacy interest ultimately was sufficient to
justify nondisclosure in the eyes of the Supreme Court.275
269 Id. On this point, Judge Fernandez wrote:
[A] list does convey more information about the recipient than a mere name and
address. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and ONDA desires this
pudding so that it can feed upon information about the people who have allowed
their names to be put on the list.., the list will at least tell others that these are
people who are interested in what happens to land that is controlled by the
policies and doings of the BLM. If all somebody wanted were a bunch of names
and addresses that conveyed no information about the individuals on the list, that
person could do a random selection from the telephone book.
Id.
270 Id. at 1172-73.
271 Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355, 355-56 (1997) (citing Dep't of Def.
v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994)); Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989).
272 Id. at 356 (citing FLRA, 510 U.S. at 496; Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 771).
213 Id. at 355.
14 See Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. Bibles, 83 F.3d 1168, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 1996)
(dissenting opinion) (citing FLRA, 510 U.S. at 501).
27 On remand, the Ninth Circuit in turn remanded to the federal district court with
instructions to dismiss ONDA's FOIA action. See Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. Bibles, 125
F.3d 1282 (9th Cir. 1997).
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C. Impact of FLRA and Bibles
In deciding both FLRA and Bibles, the Supreme Court continued to apply the
central-purpose doctrine to severely constrict the scope of FOIA-related public
interest in disclosure when balancing that interest against the individual privacy
interest in nondisclosure.276 This approach clearly allowed minimal privacy
interests to tip the scales in favor of nondisclosure in both of these cases' situations.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has never ruled in favor of disclosure of personally-
identifiable information in a FOIA privacy-exemption case. The Court seems
unlikely to do so as long as the FOIA-related privacy interest is defined as a broad
individual right to control the release and use of one's personal information and the
FOIA-related disclosure interest is constricted by the central-purpose doctrine.
Additionally, the FLRA and Bibles cases continued the Supreme Court's trend
of broadly considering derivative uses and secondary effects on the privacy side of
the balance but not on the side of disclosure in FOIA privacy-exemption cases.277
The Court has repeated this practice even though it has never directly ruled on the
propriety of considering derivative uses and secondary effects on either side of the
FOIA balance.27 To date, the Supreme Court has not explicitly resolved the
derivative uses and secondary effects issues left undecided after Ray. Arguably,
Ray, FLRA, and Bibles seem to eliminate much hope that the Court will endorse it
on the public-interest side.279 In other words, it remains unclear whether derivative
uses and secondary effects may ever be properly considered on the public-interest
side in FOIA privacy-exemption cases, and, if so, under what circumstances.
Meanwhile, they are - while unacknowledged - being used on the privacy side
of the balance.
D. Recent Developments in FOIA Privacy Jurisprudence
After Bibles, the central-purpose doctrine and the issue of derivative uses has
continued to arise in FOIA privacy-exemption cases decided by the lower federal
276 Cf. Beall, supra note 225, at 1258 (stating that after the Court's ruling in FLRA,
discussions of the continued validity of the central-purpose doctrine are "virtually
academic").
277 See id. at 1284 (stating that the Court has yet "to reveal explicitly what has been
implicit for years - that the Court is hostile to arguments favoring broad access to
government information").
278 See id. (stating that since FLRA, the "Supreme Court has not yet been forced to
announce explicitly its position with respect to the derivative-use rationale").
279 See BeVier, supra note 129, at 494. BeVier concluded that the Court's analysis in
FLRA "rendered implausible the prospect of any future claim that derivative uses of
disclosure information would prove weighty enough to compel disclosure" in FOIA privacy
exemption cases and effectively "clos[ed] off the 'derivative use' avenue" on the public
interest side of the balance. Id.
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courts. These matters are likely to arise again should the Supreme Court review
another FOIA privacy-exemption case in the future. Two recent cases decided by
federal courts of appeal are relevant for discussion here.
In City of Chicago v. Department of Treasury,"' the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held in 2002 that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
(ATF) could not deny a FOIA request for federal gun records based on either of the
two FOIA privacy exemptions.281 Subsequently, the Supreme Court vacated the
judgment of the Seventh Circuit in the case, and remanded for further
consideration. 82 However, the Seventh Circuit's opinion is important because the
appeals court used a derivative-use analysis that seemed to expand FOIA-related
public interest in disclosure beyond the dictates of the central-purpose doctrine set
out in Reporters Committee.
In City of Chicago, the city used FOIA to request information in two databases
from the ATF in connection with the city's civil lawsuit against firearm
manufacturers.283 In the civil lawsuit, the city alleged that the marketing and
distribution activities of these manufacturers had resulted in the widespread
possession and use of illegal firearms in the city.2" In furtherance of these claims,
the city wanted computerized ATF records that contained the names and addresses
of manufacturers, dealers, purchasers and possessors of registered firearms that had
been reportedly used in crimes.285 In addition, the city wanted computerized ATF
records that contained the names and addresses of unlicensed individuals who
reportedly had purchased more than one firearm from the same dealer within a five-
280 287 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2002).
28! See id. at 635-37, vacated by Dep't of Justice v. City of Chicago, 123 S. Ct. 1352
(2003). In addition, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the records in question could not be
withheld under Exemption 7 of FOIA, which protects "law enforcement records" if their
release "could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings." See id.
at 633-36. On this ground, the Court ruled that the ATF had not proven that the release of
any of the requested information would interfere with pending law enforcement proceedings.
Id. at 635.
282 See Dep't of Justice v. City of Chicago, 123 S.Ct. 1352 (2003).
283 See City of Chicago, 287 F.3d at 631-32. The ATF is a criminal and regulatory
enforcement agency within the Treasury Department. See id. at 631. Under federal gun laws,
the ATF compels firearms manufacturers, dealers and collectors to maintain records of
certain firearms transactions and make these records available to the ATF, which compiles
the information into computerized databases. See id.
284 See id. The city sought injunctive relief and monetary damages. See id.
285 This database, called the "Trace Database," comprises the names and addresses of the
manufacturers, dealers, distributors, purchasers and possessors of firearms that any law
enforcement agency has identified by serial number and reported to the ATF as having been
involved in a crime. See id. at 632.
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day period.286 The ATF denied the FOJA request for this information on personal
privacy grounds under Exemptions 6 and 7(C).287
The Seventh Circuit ruled that Exemption 6 did not apply to the gun registry
database because the information did not fit within the description "personnel and
medical files and similar files." '288 Thus, the court did not find it necessary to
balance the FOIA-related public interest in disclosure with the individual privacy
interest in nondisclosure under Exemption 6.289 Under Exemption 7(C), however,
which applies to "law enforcement records," the court found it necessary to balance
these interests.29 The court concluded that firearms transactions were not private
transactions because gun purchasers were on notice that their names and addresses
were reported to the ATF and state and local authorities.2 1 The court therefore
reasoned that there was no privacy interest in nondisclosure of the ATF records.
However, the court concluded, the public interest in disclosure of the ATF
records was "compelling." '292 Using a derivative-uses analysis, the court found that
disclosure of the records would "facilitate the analysis of national patterns of gun
trafficking" and would "shed light on ATF' s efficiency in performing its duties." '293
The court took the position that its public interest rationale was sufficient to meet
the central-purpose test of Reporters Committee.294 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case295 but subsequently vacated the judgment and remanded the
case to the Seventh Circuit for reconsideration in light of congressional legislation
enacted in 2003 that bans the ATF from using its appropriated funds to comply with
FOIA requests for the types of records that the City of Chicago was seeking in the
case.296 As pointed out by the Department of Justice in an official release on the
286 See id. at 631-32. Under federal gun laws, gun dealers were required to report this
information to the ATF, which compiled the information into a computerized database known
as the "Multiple Sales Database." See id. at 632.
287 See id. at 635-37.
288 See id. at 635-36. The court concluded that the requested ATF records clearly were
not "medical and personnel files" and were not close enough to those types of files to be
characterized as "similar files." See id. Because this definitional threshold was not met, the
court found it unnecessary to even consider whether release of the records "would result in
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" under Exemption 6. See id. at 635. In
addition, the court pointed out that other courts had held that that there is no individual
privacy interest in the purchase of a firearm. See id. at 636 (citing Ctr. to Prevent Handgun
Violence v. Dep't of Treasury, 981 F. Supp. 20, 23 (D.D.C. 1997)).
289 Id. at 635-36.
290 Id. at 637.
291 Id.
292 id.
293 Id.
294 Id. (citing Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
773 (1989)).
295 See Dep't of Treasury v. City of Chicago, 537 U.S. 1018 (2002).
291 See id. at 537 U.S. at 1018 (referring specifically to Division J, Title 6, § 644, of the
2003]
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case, the congressional legislation was passed just two weeks before the Supreme
Court was scheduled to hear oral arguments.297 Whether the Supreme Court would
revisit the City of Chicago case after the Seventh Circuit deals with the case on
remand remained uncertain at the time of this article. Whether the ultimate
outcome will shed any light on the issue of how and when derivative-use analyses
should apply in FOIA privacy exemption cases also remained to be seen.
At the time of this article, the Supreme Court was scheduled to hear oral
arguments in another FOIA privacy-exemption case, this one an Exemption 7(C)
case dealing with a lawyer's FOIA request to the Office of the Independent Counsel
(OIC) for photographs related to the death of former President Bill Clinton's White
House Deputy Counsel, Vincent W. Foster.298 In the case, attorney Allan J. Favish
had used FOIA in January 1997 and requested copies of 150 photographs taken at
the death scene and autopsy including various photographs of Foster's body.299 The
National Park Service, FBI, and subcommittees of both the House and Senate all
investigated Foster's death and concluded that he had committed suicide by
shooting himself with a gun."°
Favish, who had represented the group Accuracy in Media (AIM) in an earlier
unsuccessful attempt to gain access to some of the same photographs,3"' questioned
the agencies' investigations of Foster's death and their ultimate conclusions, and
submitted his own FOIA request for photographs.1 2 The tIC denied Favish's
individual FOIA request under Exemption 7(C), which allows an agency to
withhold law enforcement records on personal privacy grounds. 3 Favish filed suit
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, H.R.J. Con. Res. 2, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003)).
The joint resolution, which was signed into law by President George W. Bush on February
20, 2003, contains a section that prohibits appropriated funds from being utilized to "take any
action based upon any provision [of FOIA]" with regard to certain records including those
"provided by Federal, State, local or foreign law enforcement agencies in connection with
... the tracing of a firearm," and records of multiple gun sales required under sections 923(3)
and (7) of Title 44 of the United States Code. H.J. Res. 2, 108th Cong. (2003).
" U.S. Dep't of Justice, Supreme Court Vacates and Remands in ATF Database Case
(2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2003foiapostl l.htm (last modified
Mar. 23, 2003).
298 Office of the Indep. Counsel v. Favish, 123 S.Ct. 1928 (2003).
299 See Favish v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1170, 1179-81 (9th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 1170, 1183.
3o See generally Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 194 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1111 (2000). The Ninth Circuit ruled that Favish was not
estopped from making his own FOIA request for the photographs solely by having been
involved in the Accuracy in Media case. See Favish, 217 F.3d at 1171.
302 See Favish, 217 F.3d at 1170.
" Id. at 1170. The OIC also claimed that the photographs were subject to Exemption
7(A), which allows an agency to withhold law enforcement records when "release could
reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings." See id. (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)7 (1994)). Ultimately, the OIC abandoned this argument during litigation. Id. at
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in federal district court, after which the OIC released 118 of the requested
photographs and Favish withdrew his request for twenty-one other photographs.3°4
Without inspecting the eleven photographs still at issue, the district court ordered
the release of one that already had been released to the media and ruled that the
other ten could be withheld on privacy grounds.30 5
On appeal, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the district court
should have inspected the disputed photographs, and reversed and remanded the
case with instructions." 6 Quoting from Reporters Committee, the Ninth Circuit
reminded the district court that the purpose of FOIA is to "shed light 'on an
agency's performance of its statutory duties.""'3 7 On that point, the appeals court
wrote that Favish's purpose was to investigate the conduct of the official
investigations of Foster's death and thus concluded that his FOIA request was in
"complete conformity" with the purpose of the statute.3"8 The appeals court did not
indicate how the photographs might aid an investigation of the official inquiries into
Foster's death, so the court's rationale on this point remains murky.
On the privacy side of the balance, the Ninth Circuit ruled as a matter of law
that Exemption 7(C) could be invoked to protect the personal privacy of Foster's
family including his sister, mother, children, and widow.3" The court
1171-72. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the "bulk of the photos
requested were already in the public domain," and Favish was requesting higher quality
copies of those photographs. Id. at 1171. The appeals court questioned how "higher quality
photographs released to Favish would interfere with law enforcement." Moreover, the Court
noted this argument "was not and has not been explained by an agency under a statutory duty
to comply promptly with a freedom of information request." Id. at 1171-72.
'04 Id. at 1170.
305 Id. at 1171. The district court did not conduct an in camera review of the ten
photographs that it ruled could be withheld under Exemption 7(C) of FOIA. Id. at 1174.
'06 Id. at 1174.
307 Id. at 1171 (quoting Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 772-73 (1989)).
308 Id. at 1172. The appeals court pointed out that Favish was not required to come
forward with evidence of official malfeasance in order to justify his FOIA request, although
such evidence might weigh on the "urgency" of a request if presented. Id. at 1172-73. The
appeals court noted that Favish had presented evidence that, if true, justified his suspicions
about the official investigations of Foster's death. Id. at 1173. However, the court also
concluded that it was not required to evaluate the veracity or sufficiency of that evidence in
considering Favish's FOIA request. Id.
'09 Id. at 1173. The Ninth Circuit said that determining "whose personal privacy" is
protected by Exemption 7(C) was unclear due to the "imprecision" of the statute. Id The
court noted that in previous cases, privacy protection of FOIA had been extended to the
families of a deceased president (citing Katz v. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., 862 F.
Supp. 476, 485-86 (D.D.C. 1994), affid on other grounds, 68 F.3d 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1995))
and families of astronauts killed in the Challenger disaster (citing N. Y. Times Co. v. Nat'l
Aeronautics & Space Admin., 920 F.2d 1002, 1009-10 (D.C. Cir. 1990) and 782 F. Supp.
628 (D.D.C. 1991) (on remand)). The court in the "Challenger" case stated:
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acknowledged the existence of a "zone of privacy in which a spouse, a parent, a
child, a brother, or a sister preserves the memory of the deceased loved one," and
concluded generally that to "violate that memory is to invade the personality of the
survivor."31 In addition, the court suggested that media coverage and scrutiny
would constitute an invasion of the zone of familial privacy that includes the
memory of a deceased relative."'
In addition, the Ninth Circuit tacitly endorsed the consideration of derivative
uses and secondary effects on the privacy side of the balance. For instance, the
court wrote: "Strictly speaking, it is not 'the production' of the records that would
cause the harms suggested by the declaration but their exploitation by the media
including publication on the Internet."3"2 The court reasoned that the language of
We hold as a matter of law that the personal privacy in [Exemption 7(C)]
extends to the memory of the deceased held by those tied closely to the deceased
by blood or love and therefore that the expectable invasions of their privacy
caused by the released of records made for law enforcement must be balanced
against the public purpose to be served by disclosure.
Id.
31 Id. Similarly, in Accuracy in Media, lnc.v. Nat'l Park Serv., 194 F.3d 120, 123 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, concluded that surviving members of
Foster's family had a FOIA-related privacy interest in connection with a FOIA request filed
by the AIM for death scene and autopsy photographs, stating that "AIM cannot deny the
powerful sense of invasion bound to be aroused in close survivors by wanton publication of
gruesome details of death by violence." Id.
' See Favish, 217 F.3d at 1173. The Ninth Circuit wrote: "To violate [the memory of a
deceased loved one] is to invade the personality of the survivor. The intrusion of the media
would constitute invasion of an aspect of human personality essential to being human, the
survivor's memory of the beloved dead." Id. In Favish, Foster's sister had filed a declaration
under oath claiming that the release of the requested photographs "would set off another
round of intense media scrutiny by the media" and that the family would be the "focus of
conceivably unsavory and distasteful media coverage." Id.
Similarly, in Accuracy in Media, the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, concluded that
surviving members of Foster's family had a FOIA-related privacy interest in connection with
a FOIA request filed by AIM for death scene and autopsy photographs. See Accuracy in
Media, 194 F.3d at 123 (stating that "AIM cannot deny the powerful sense of invasion bound
to be aroused in close survivors by wanton publication of gruesome details of death by
violence"). The district court ruled against access to photographs of Foster's body at the
death scene and in autopsy, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed on appeal. See id. at 121,124. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari and refused to hear the case. See Accuracy in Media, Inc.
v. Nat'l Park Serv., 529 U.S. 111 (2000). As mentioned in the Favish case, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the fact that Favish had represented AIM in the Accuracy in Media case involving
the access to various Foster death photographs did not estop Favish from pursuing his own
individual FOIA request and litigation. See supra note 30; see also Favish, 217 F.3d at 1171.
312 id.
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the privacy exemption rendered it appropriate to consider the "probable
consequences of the release" when considering the privacy side of the equation.
1 3
Thus, the appeals court instructed the district court to review the photographs
and "balance the effect of their release on the privacy of the Foster family against
the public benefit to be obtained by their release."'3 14 On remand, without much
explanation, the district court found that five of the photographs should be released
as "probative of the public's right to know" and found that the remaining five
photographs should be withheld as intrusions on the "zone of privacy of the
survivors." '315 On appeal yet again, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court,
except for withholding access to one of the five photographs that the district court
had ordered released.316 The Supreme Court granted certiorari n 2003"' and thus,
will have yet another opportunity to address the issue of when - if ever -
derivative uses and secondary effects should be considered in FOIA privacy-
exemption cases when considering the public interest in access or the individual
interest in privacy, or, as is the recommendation of these authors, both.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY: PERSONAL INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENT
DATABASES
In addition to the protection afforded under the two FOIA privacy
exemptions," ' the Supreme Court has recognized an implied and limited
constitutional right to informational privacy that holds implications under FOIA for
derivative uses of government-held information and the secondary effects of
disclosure."t 9 This section explores the implied constitutional right of informational
privacy in government-held data and draws conclusions that could impact FOIA
privacy-exemption cases.
The threads of privacy are woven throughout American jurisprudence.
Constitutional scholar Lucas A. Powe, Jr., observed that "[t]he Supreme Court, in
fact almost everyone, recognizes a place for secrecy in our society.- 320 Although
313 Id.; cf Accuracy in Media, 194 F.3d at 123 (noting that Exemption 7(C) protects
against "unwarranted 'invasions"' of personal privacy, and that it was the release of the
Foster death photos that "triggers a weighing of the public interest against the privacy harm
inflicted" and "not the grief or any feeding frenzy of media coverage" that ensues).
314 Favish, 217 F.3d at 1174.
31" Favish v. Office of the Indep. Counsel, No. CV97-1479 WDK, 2001 WL 770410 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 11, 2001).
316 Favish v. Office of the Indep. Counsel, No. 01-55487, 37 Fed.Appx. 863, 2002 WL
1263948 (9th Cir. June 6, 2002).
317 Office of the Indep. Counsel v. Favish, 2003 WL 2011010 (2003).
318 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(7), 7(C) (1994).
319 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
320 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 197 (1991).
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the Constitution does not provide an explicit right of individual privacy, the
Supreme Court has said there is an implied right of privacy grounded primarily in
the Bill of Rights,3 2' and the Fourteenth Amendment's "concept of personal
liberty. 3 2 This implied right of privacy remains largely undefined in Supreme
Court jurisprudence, although the Court has said it covers at least two distinct
interests.323
First, the Court has said that individuals have a constitutionally protected
interest in making certain fundamental decisions free from government intrusion -
a right of personal autonomy.324 In a series of cases, the Court has said this interest
321 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The term "privacy" is not
mentioned in the Constitution. Although Griswold involves government limitations on
personal autonomy, Justice William 0. Douglas, who wrote the opinion for the Court, spoke
expansively of "zones of privacy" contained within "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights,
specifically the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments: "[Sipecific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy." Id. at 484 (citing Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-22 (dissenting opinion)). In 1977, the Court recognized that
the constitutionally protected "zone of privacy" included two separate interests: "the interest
in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions" and "the individual interest
in avoiding disclosure in personal matters." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-610 (1977);
see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(defining the constitutional right of privacy as "the right to be let alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men").
322 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 nn.23-24. The Court in Whalen noted that previous opinions
had been somewhat unclear on the source of the implied right of constitutional privacy, but
that in Roe v. Wade, decided in 1973, the Court had already determined that the implied right
of constitutional privacy was grounded in the "Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty." Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)). The Whalen decision is
discussed more extensively. See infra notes 332-56 and accompanying text.
In addition, some scholars have called the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures a "zone" of constitutionally protected privacy. See, e.g.,
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 120-21 (1992) (referring to this
zone of privacy as the right of "seclusion"); see also Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid
& Assocs. 379 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1980) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)). The
Supreme Court has pointed out that this Fourth Amendment right is explicit, and it is not
treated in this article as a component of the implicit right of constitutional privacy. See
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.24. The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
government searches and seizures is not directly relevant to this article and, therefore, will
not be discussed.
323 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600.
324 Id. at 599-600 & n.26 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897)).
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covers such decisions as whether to educate one's child publicly or privately,3 25 to
3227
use contraception,"' to have an abortion,327 or to enter into an interracial
marriage.3 2' About a decade after these cases were first decided, the Supreme Court
has said that there is also a second constitutional privacy interest - one that
prevents government disclosure of an individual's personal affairs.3 29 This is often
called the right of informational privacy,33 and like the right to personal autonomy,
it also remains largely undefined by the Court.
33
'
A. Whalen v. Roe (1977)
To date, the Supreme Court has decided only one case directly addressing the
constitutionally-based privacy interests of individuals named in government
databases. In Whalen v. Roe,332 decided in 1977, the Court held that New York
Constitutional scholar Professor Rodney Smolla referred to this as the constitutional
right of "autonomy." See SMOLLA, supra note 322, at 121. Professor Fred Cate has referred
to this privacy right as that of "fundamental decision-making," and has called it the "most
controversial constitutional right to privacy." See Fred H. Cate, The Challenging Face of
Privacy Protection in the European Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 174,200
(1999).
31 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510; see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390 (holding that state statutes
that limited the teaching of foreign languages in public schools was unconstitutional).
326 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
327 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 113; Bolton, 410 U.S. at 179.
328 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
329 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,599 (1977) (citing Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416
U.S. 21, 79 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928); Shultz, 416
U.S. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring)).
330 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 589 (upholding New York legislation that required physicians
to compile prescription records containing detailed patient information for a centralized state
database on harmful legal drugs); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977)
(compelling President Nixon to disclose personal communications to government archivists
in light of the important public interest in preserving the materials). Rodney Smolla has
called this the individual interest in maintaining "secrecy." See SMOLLA, supra note 322, at
121; see also FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1997); Don R. Pember, The
Burgeoning Scope of Access Privacy and the Portent for a Free Press, 64 IOWA L. REV.
1155 (1979).
"' One state supreme court has called this the least defined zone of constitutional privacy.
See Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1980).
332 429 U.S. 589 (1977). In a 1975 decision, the Supreme Court had ruled that an
individual did not have a constitutional right of privacy that would have prevented a state law
enforcement agency from disclosing the fact that he had been arrested for shoplifting. See
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1975). A year later, the Court held that an individual did
not have a constitutional right of privacy that would have prevented the government from
obtaining information given by that individual to a banking institution. See United States v.
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could constitutionally maintain a computerized database of the names and addresses
of patients and their prescribing doctors when legal drugs such as methadone,
amphetamines, and methaqualone (so-called "scheduled drugs") were prescribed for
medical purposes.333 In finding for the state of New York, the Court said state
governments have the right to collect and use personal data when there are statutory
or regulatory limits on public disclosure." 4
The Whalen case arose after the New York legislature passed the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) in 1972.13' The CSA required physicians to report each
prescription they issued for a scheduled drug to the state health department. 3 6 The
state wanted to monitor these prescriptions to prevent scheduled drugs from
entering the illegal market through forged prescriptions and over-prescribing by
physicians.337 The health department logged the prescription forms in a
computerized database, and the data was stored in secured facilities.33 The CSA
prohibited public disclosure of patient identifications and provided criminal
sanctions for state employees who willfully violated the disclosure ban.339
A coalition of patients and physicians challenged the CSA in federal district
court on constitutional privacy grounds - they claimed that the patient-
identification requirements would chill the doctor-patient relationship and cause
patients to refuse prescriptions for state-monitored drugs in fear of disclosure and
stigmatization.3" The district court agreed and enjoined the state from collecting
patient identifications.' The district court concluded that the doctor-patient
relationship fell within a constitutionally-protected zone of privacy under the
Fourteenth Amendment and was infringed by state-compelled reporting of patient
identifications.342
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). However, neither of these cases specifically mentioned a
constitutional zone of informational privacy.
13 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591, 593 & n.8, 603-04.
314 Id. at 605.
... See id. at 591-92 & n.4. The CSA was patterned after similar laws in California and
Illinois. See id. at 592 & n.5.
"' Id. at 591-92. The affected drugs were for limited lawful medical uses such as the
treatment of epilepsy, narcolepsy, hyperkinesia, schizo-affective disorders, and migraine
headaches. Id. at 593 & n.8.
337 New York argued that there was no other effective way to keep people from using
stolen or forged prescriptions, pharmacists from illegally refilling expired prescriptions,
patients from seeking multiple prescriptions from different physicians, and physicians from
over-prescribing. See id. at 592.
331 Id. at 593-94.
339 Id.
0 Roe v. Ingrahm, 403 F. Supp. 931, 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
341 Id. at 937-38.
" See id. On the privacy issue, the court said, "An individual's physical ills and
disabilities, the medication he takes, [and] the frequency of his medical consultation are
among the most sensitive of personal and psychological sensibilities." Id. at 937. The district
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On appeal, however, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed and concluded
that the reporting scheme was a rational legislative attempt to try and address the
problem of illegal distribution and overuse of scheduled drugs. 343 In an opinion
penned by Justice Stevens, the Whalen Court said that the reporting requirements
did not represent a "sufficiently grievous threat" to the implied constitutional
interests in informational privacy or independent decision making. 3" On the
informational privacy issue, the Court said that concerns over the secondary effects
of unauthorized patient disclosures were speculative and, therefore, insufficient as
grounds to render the CSA unconstitutional.345 The Court emphasized that the
statutory provisions contained safeguards against unauthorized disclosure and found
these to be adequate for protecting patient privacy.346 The Court noted that there
was no evidence that unauthorized disclosures had occurred.347 The Court also
noted that "unpleasant invasions of privacy" were a necessary part of "modem
medical practice" because patient information already was being routinely disclosed
to insurance companies, hospital personnel, and various public agencies."
court applied strict constitutional scrutiny to the reporting scheme and found that although
the state had a compelling interest in controlling drug abuse and illicit drug trafficking, the
CSA was unnecessarily broad in scope by requiring the reporting of patient identifications.
See id. The court suggested that the state could meet its regulatory goals of monitoring the
distribution of the drugs in question with just the names of prescribing physicians and
dispensing pharmacies. See id.
" See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977). Unlike the district court below, the
Whalen Court applied intermediate constitutional scrutiny to the reporting scheme. See id.
In addition, the Whalen Court said that even if it was not clear that the reporting requirements
were effective, New York had a "vital interest in controlling the distribution of dangerous
drugs" that would justify a "decision to experiment with new techniques for control." Id.
'44 See id. at 600.
3" In his concurring opinion in Whalen, Justice Brennan suggested a factual scenario that
would have yielded a different result. Had New York engaged in "broad dissemination" of
the prescription information, he stated, constitutional privacy rights would have been clearly
implicated. Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). Had that been the case, Brennan said, New
York would have been required to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest
supporting public disclosure. Id. at 606. Absent such an interest, he stated that the scheme
would have failed strict constitutional scrutiny and presumably been declared
unconstitutional. Id. at 606-07.
346 Id. at 594, 601-02.
347 Id. at 604 n.32 (distinguishing Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960) and
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,462 (1958), both freedom of association cases, in which
actual harm had been proven by disclosures of personal identities).
348 Id. at 602. The Court went on to discuss the role of information sharing in the medical
context, stating that "disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital
personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health agencies are often an essential part
of modem medical practice even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the
character of the patient." Id. The Court said that disclosure of patients' prescription drug
information to authorized state employees thus did not "automatically amount to an
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The Whalen Court concluded that New York's reporting scheme did not deprive
patients of the right to independently decide with their physicians whether to use
a scheduled drug.349 Justice Stevens wrote that the decision to prescribe and use any
of the scheduled drugs was "left entirely to the physician and the patient" and was
not dependent on approval of the state or any other third party.35 He cited to
evidence that the state was recording 100,000 prescriptions per month under the
CSA and concluded on that evidence that the reporting requirements were not
seriously impeding prescriptions for scheduled drugs. 5 ' Despite finding no
constitutional violations in that case, the Whalen Court strongly cautioned that
advancing information technology brought with it potentially legitimate threats to
privacy."' On this point, Stevens wrote:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation
of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or
other massive government files. The collection of taxes, the distribution
of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision of public health,
the direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal
laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of
information, much of which is personal in character and potentially
embarrassing or harmful if disclosed.353
The Whalen Court did not flesh out the constitutional right of informational
privacy, nor was that even necessary to the holding in the case.3" The Court merely
impermissible invasion of privacy." Id. For further discussion of these issues in the context
of medical records, see for example, Patricia I. Carter, Health Information Privacy: Can
Congress Protect Confidential Medical Information in the "Information Age?" 25 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 223 (1999).
'9 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603. In addition, the Court pointed out that New York could have
banned the scheduled drugs altogether. Id.
350 Id.
'5' Id. Arguably, this point ignores the proposition that government collection of personal
data, especially in computerized databases, allows enhanced government surveillance of
individuals that may indeed threaten individual privacy interests. See ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 158-68 (1967).
352 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also BeVier, supra
note 129, at 491-92.
151 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605 (emphasis added). In his concurring opinion in Whalen,
Justice Brennan echoed this concern, stating, 'The central storage and easy accessibility of
computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of the information, and I am not
prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on
such technology." Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
... Pember, supra note 330, at 1175. In a case decided in 2001, the Supreme Court
acknowledged the implied constitutional right of informational privacy in the context of a
civil suit in tort against a media defendant for allegedly broadcasting an intercepted telephone
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held that New York's prescription drug-reporting scheme did not invade a
constitutionally-protected zone of personal privacy, primarily, because of the strict
controls that were in place to prevent unauthorized disclosure.355 After Whalen, the
implied right of informational privacy remained unclear, including what information
would be "personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if
disclosed," as quoted in the passage above.35 6
conversation. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). A six-to-three Court majority
ruled that the First Amendment protected a Pennsylvania radio station from liability and
punishment for broadcasting a secretly taped cell phone conversation between two teachers'
union representatives. Both federal and Pennsylvania state wiretapping laws prohibit the
secret taping of phone conversations. During a contentious period of collective bargaining
talks, the two teachers' union representatives were discussing whether teachers would receive
a three-percent raise as offered by the school district or a six-percent raise as proposed by the
teachers union. One of the union leaders was taped as saying, "If they're not going to move
for three percent, we're gonna have to go to their, their homes ... to blow off their front
porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those guys." See id. at 518-19. The Court
held that the radio station had a First Amendment right to broadcast the tape because of its
high public-interest value. See id. at 533-34. However, the Court also acknowledged that
the Constitution implies a privacy interest in private facts under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 518. In recognizing this constitutionally protected informational privacy interest, the
Bartnicki Court implicitly called upon the holding of the Whalen opinion. Both the Bartnicki
and Whalen opinions were written for Court majorities by Justice Stevens. Id. at 516. See
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 590.
... See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06; see also Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.
425, 458-59 (1977) (stating that the Whalen Court had rejected a constitutional privacy
challenge to the collection of personal medical information in a state computer database and
had emphasized statutory measures against unauthorized disclosure). The Whalen decision
has been characterized as providing states with an affirmative and broad "right to collect and
use data about individual citizens." Jennifer Bresnahan, Personalization, Privacy, and the
First Amendment: A Look at the Law and Policy Behind Electronic Databases, 5 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 8 (2000) available at http:/lwww.vjolLnet/vol5/issue3/v5i3aO8-Bresnahan.html (last
visited Oct. 3, 2003).
356 As commentators have pointed out, the lower federal courts have not been consistent
in interpreting the implied constitutional right of privacy. See, e.g., Cate, supra note 330, at
202-03 (discussing Doe v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Att'y
Gen., 941 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1991); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir.
1983); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); Schacter v.
Whalen, 581 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978) as
extending the implied right of privacy to "non-fundamental matters;" and discussing Walls
v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990) and J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th
Cir. 1981) as having "severely limited the scope of the Whalen nondisclosure privacy right");
see also Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REv. 815, 828-30
(2000) (discussing Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1988)).
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B. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (1977)
In 1977, the Supreme Court again recognized an implied constitutional privacy
interest in the disclosure of personal information held by the government. In Nixon
v. Administrator of General Services,35 7 decided four months after Whalen, the
Court held that the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act35 did
not infringe on any constitutional privacy interest held by former President Richard
M. Nixon."9 The Act, signed into law by President Gerald Ford, required the then
out-of-office Nixon to surrender possession of an estimated forty-two million pages
of documents and 880 tape recordings accumulated during his presidency.3 60 The
materials were then to be screened by government archivists so that private
information and materials could be removed and returned to Nixon.36' The
remainder would be open to public review for historical and other purposes.362
Relying on Whalen, the Nixon Court rejected the former president's argument
that having his personal materials screened by the government archivists violated
his constitutional right of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 63 The Court
agreed with Nixon that he had a constitutional privacy interest in personal
communications contained in the records, but said this privacy interest had to be
weighed against the strong interest in public review and historical preservation of
nonpersonal presidential materials.3" The Court concluded that only a "small
fraction" of the materials were private and that screening was the only method to
separate the private from the nonprivate materials.365 In addition, the Court
explained that the materials were to be screened by government archivists with an
"unblemished record for discretion" and concluded that Nixon's fear of further
disclosure of his personal affairs was therefore unfounded. 66
"' Nixon, 433 U.S. at 455-65.
358 Presidential Recordings & Materials Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695
(codified at 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1970 & Supp. V 1974)).
3-5 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465.
31 Id. at 429-36. The materials were being stored in a depository under a previous
agreement that Nixon had reached with the Administrator of General Services in which the
materials were to be stored near Nixon's home in California for a prescribed time period and
destroyed upon his death. Id. at 431-32.
361 Id. at 429.
362 Id. at 435.
363 Id. at 457-59, 465.
364 Id. at 465.
365 Id. at 454.
366 Id. at 462-65 (quoting Nixon 408 F. Supp. at 365).
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C. Impact of Whalen and Nixon
The Whalen and Nixon cases suggest that related constitutional interests in
information and decisional privacy exist under the Fourteenth Amendment. In
particular, the Whalen decision is significant because the Court acknowledged that
individuals have a privacy interest in their personally-identifiable information
collected by the government. While the parameters of these constitutional interests
remained unclear after both Whalen and Nixon,367 several conclusions can be drawn
from the opinions regarding government collection and use of personally-
identifiable information.
First, in each case, the Court found that asserted fears of unauthorized public
disclosure were unfounded. It was significant to the Court in both cases, however,
that official controls were in place to minimize the possibility of unauthorized
disclosures, 368 and, in Whalen in particular, that such disclosures had not in fact
occurred.369 Clearly, the Whalen Court was unwilling to speculate about potential
but unproven threats to individual privacy. 70
Second, Whalen and Nixon stand for the proposition that individual privacy
interests can be outweighed by public interests that are served by government
collection and use of personally-identifiable data. In Whalen, the Court concluded
that the public interest in curbing illegal drug trafficking outweighed the privacy
interests of individuals named in New York's prescription drug database. 7'
Likewise, in Nixon, the public interest in preserving presidential materials for
historical purposes was found more significant than Nixon's personal privacy
interest in keeping government archivists from sifting through his personal
communications.372
Third, these cases suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment's implied
constitutional zone of privacy is not easily infringed by government collection of
personally-identifiable information. For instance, the Whalen Court said it would
have taken a "sufficiently grievous threat" to patient privacy to find a constitutional
violation, which was not established in the case.373
Hence, Whalen and Nixon hold significant implications for public access to
government-held information under FOIA. In both cases, the Court recognized a
constitutional interest in informational privacy and clearly articulated concerns
regarding personal information collected by the government. This suggests that
367 See supra note 355.
368 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 462-63.
369 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06.
310 See id.
3" See id. at 598, 606.
372 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465.
13 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600.
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embarrassing or harmful secondary effects of disclosure might be relevant in a
constitutional-privacy analysis, although the Court did not explicitly say so. Both
Whalen and Nixon, therefore, leave open the door for a constitutional-privacy
argument to trump the FOIA statutory right of disclosure. Indeed, such an argument
has already been successful regarding state open-records laws in at least one state.374
In a 1998 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the implied
right of constitutional privacy recognized in Whalen was successfully raised to
preclude disclosure of records under Ohio's open-records law. 75 At this time, in
addition to the Sixth Circuit, the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits also have
recognized the implied right of informational privacy sketched by the Court in
Whalen. 76 To date, the authors' research shows that a constitutionally-based
privacy challenge to disclosure has not arisen under FOIA. Nonetheless, Whalen
and Nixon might be used as a means to defeat access separate from any legislatively
created privacy protections under FOIA.
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
FOIA's legislative history shows that Congress clearly intended to make it
possible for the public to gain access to federal-agency records without the need for
requesters to explain why they wanted the information.377 Congress also saw the
need to protect some personal information from public disclosure, and thus crafted
exemptions to allow federal agencies to withhold some information on personal
... See Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that
disclosure of information from undercover police officers' personnel files to criminal defense
attorneys violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to privacy and personal security). In
Kallstrom, Columbus police officers pointed to the Court's recognition of informational
privacy in Whalen in order to successfully block automatic disclosure of police personnel
files, which otherwise would have been disclosable under the Ohio public records statute. See
id. One commentator has stated that the Kallstrom decision narrowly construed the
constitutional interest in nondisclosure of public records in the case to that of preventing
"life-threatening harm" and thus was a victory of access advocates on that count. See
Schwartz, supra note 356, at 828-29.
... Kallstrom, 136 F.3d 1055.
376 See CATE, supra note 330, at 202-03 (discussing Doe v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72
F.3d 1133, 1137 (3d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Att'y Gen., 941 F.2d 780, 795-97 (9th Cir. 1991),
vacated by 518 U.S. 1014 (1996); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1558-59 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
638 F.2d 570,577 (3d Cir. 1980); Schacter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1978), affg
445 F. Supp. 1376 (1978); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1978), cert
denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979)).
377 See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text; see also Dep't of Air Force v. Rose,
425 U.S. 352, 360-62 (1976), aff'g 495 F.2d 261 (1974)(discussing the general purpose of
FOIA).
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privacy grounds.378 Ostensibly, Congress intended for the privacy exemptions to
prevent "unwarranted invasion[s] of personal privacy" and not merely trivial or
inconvenient infractions of individual privacy.379 While congressional intent called
for a balancing analysis when public access and individual privacy interests collide
under FOIA, Congress also emphasized the importance of "fullest responsible
disclosure" and did not intend for individual privacy interests to easily prevail over
the public interest in access.38 ° Congress left it up to the courts to determine how
to balance access and privacy interests in FOIA privacy-exemption requests.
Indeed, when the Supreme Court decided a FOIA privacy-exemption case the
first time in Rose,38" ' Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, established such a
balancing test. As discussed, the Rose balancing test calls for courts to weigh the
public interest in disclosure against the individual interest i. privacy on an ad hoc
basis in FOIA privacy-exemption cases.382 The Court said FOIA' s legislative history
makes clear that the statute was "broadly conceived," and Congress intended for the
statute to permit access to official information and to open agency action to public
scrutiny.38 3 Brennan emphasized that any exceptions to disclosure must fall under
one or more of the statute's nine exemptions,3 ' and these exemptions "must be
narrowly construed.""38 The opinion further noted that Congress' move to include
exemptions to the Act should not obscure the legislative intent that disclosure is
FOIA's "dominant objective." '386 In Rose, the Supreme Court said the role of the
courts was to prevent federal agencies from erecting broad barriers to public
access.387 The Rose Court also suggested that speculative threats to privacy should
not be used to outweigh the public interest in access.38 ' Justice Brennan wrote that
Congress intended Exemption 6 to ameliorate "threats to privacy interests more
palpable than mere possibilities. 389
378 See supra note 8.
179 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
380 See S. REP. No. 93-813, at 3 (1965).
381 Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
382 See id. at 372.
' Id. at 361 (citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973)).
381 See supra note 8.
38 Rose, 425 U.S. at 361.
316 Id. at 361.
387 id. at 379 ("Congress vested the courts with the responsibility ultimately to determine
'de novo' any dispute as to whether the exemption was properly invoked in order to constrain
agencies from withholding non exempt matters.").
318 See id. at 380 n.19.
389 id.
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A. Altering the FOIA Calculus: Emphasis on Individual Privacy Interests
Beginning with the Washington Post case,390 the Court began a trend of broadly
interpreting FOIA-related privacy interests and allowed even a minimal privacy
concern to trigger FOIA privacy exemptions. 9 ' The Court tipped the scales of
balance significantly further in favor of privacy in Reporters Committee, when the
Court established the central-purpose doctrine.392 This test restricted the ambit of
disclosable records by stringently limiting the FOIA-related public interest in access
to only those records that directly revealed government activity.393 Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg has written that the central-purpose doctrine established in
Reporters Committee altered the "FOIA calculus." 394 In her concurring opinion in
FLRA, she expressed discomfort with the Court's analysis and pointed out that the
central-purpose doctrine represents a "restrictive definition" of the public interest
in access that does not appear in the legislative history of FOIA.395 However, she
acquiesced to the central-purpose requirement imposed by the Court in Reporters
Committee, deferring tojudicial precedent on this matter of statutory interpretation,
and noted that Congress was free to amend FOIA if it disagreed with the Reporters
Committee Court.
3 96
Arguably, as one commentator has noted, the Supreme Court has concocted a
balancing scheme that allows federal agencies to use the FOIA privacy exemptions
"as shields to repel requests... [for any] records containing personally identifiable
information." '397 This makes it extremely difficult for lower courts to expand on the
narrow confines of the central-purpose doctrine. For instance, as discussed, the
390 Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982), rev'g 647 F.2d 197 (1981).
"' See Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355 (1997) (per curiam), rev'g 83
F.3d 1165 (1996) (holding privacy exemption triggered when public interest was simply to
provide more information to people on a government mailing list); Dep't of Def. v. FLRA,
510 U.S. 487 (1994), rev'g 1990 WL 156669 (F.L.R.A. Sept. 29, 1990) (holding that
employee addresses were exempt from FOIA because public interest would at most be to
enhance communication); Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991), rev'g 725 F. Supp.
502 (1989) (holding that unredacted reports of interviews with Haitians were exempt and
required redaction of names before allowing access); Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm.
for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), rev'g 816 F.2d 730 (1987) (holding that the
FBI 'rap sheet' was exempt because information concerned a private individual and not an
agency).
392 See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 749. One commentator has pointed out that under
the central-purpose doctrine, a FOLA requestor has the burden of proving that the request will
reveal what the government is up to. See Beall, supra note 225, at 1261.
393 See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774.
314 See FLRA, 510 U.S. at 505 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
395 Id. at 505-08.
396 See id. at 509.
391 See BeVier, supra note 129, at 485.
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Ninth Circuit's attempt in Bibles to apply a derivative-uses analysis and expand
FOIA-related public interest in disclosure was met with a unanimous reversal and
sharp rebuke on appeal to the Supreme Court.39"
The Court has further restricted disclosure by applying a uses and effects
analysis in FOIA privacy cases on the privacy side of the balance while shunning
the same approach on the public-interest side. The Court has declined to decide
when, if ever, derivative uses and secondary effects should be considered in
privacy-exemption cases.399 But in practice, the Court has typically applied a
privacy-side derivative-uses analysis, considering speculative harmful secondary
effects of disclosure when weighing the individual interest in secrecy, while
refusing to consider potentially beneficial secondary effects of disclosure when
weighing the public interest in public access.4" In its uses and effects analyses, the
Court has thus directly or implicitly considered how specific record seekers would
use the requested records despite FOIA statutory language that plainly states
requests can by made by "any person"' and guidelines issued by the Federal Office
of Information and Privacy stating the identities of specific requesters cannot be a
factor in disclosure decisions." 2 The Court has, in effect, established a defacto rule
against disclosure that cannot be found in either the plain language or the legislative
history of FOIA.
Essentially, the Supreme Court has virtually ignored the notion that broad
access to public records fulfills important societal functions beyond just informing
the public about government operations. For example, the kinds of valuable
information gleaned from federal agency records includes demographic trends
available from census data held by the Department of Commerce, and crucial public
health and safety information, ranging from commercial aircraft maintenance
398 Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355 (1997).
399 In Ray, Justices Scalia and Kennedy supported a blanket ban on the consideration of
derivative uses of information on both sides of FOIA privacy exemption balance. See Dep't
of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 180-82 (1991). In a seeming contradiction to their stance in
Ray, Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined in the Court's opinion in FLRA, which considered
derivative uses and secondary effects on the privacy side of the balance. See FLRA, 510 U.S.
487.
400 See Bibles, 519 U.S. at 355; FLRA, 510 U.S. at 487; Ray, 502 U.S. at 164; Dep't of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989); Dep't of State
v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982); Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352
(1976).
40' See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994); see also FOIA GUIDE, supra note 47, at 38.
40' See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 47, at 39 (stating that "FOIA requests can be made for
any reason whatsoever; because the purpose for which records are sought has no bearing
upon the merits of the request, FOIA requesters do not have to explain or justify their
requests."). The Office of Information and Privacy is the agency within the Department of
Justice that is charged under the FOIA statute with overseeing FOIA operations. See id. at
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records from the FAA, to the results of clinical drug trials from the FDA. The use
of government records and database information also provides significant and
overlooked economical benefits to society which should be viewed as furthering the
public interest in access.4"3 These benefits include: providing U.S. capital markets
with data; providing information that allows creditors to verify the credit-worthiness
of applicants and reduce the cost of credit; aiding in the location of heirs and other
financial beneficiaries; providing attorneys with information in criminal and civil
litigation matters; aiding businesses in the selection and location of operations and
facilities; assisting check verification services; and facilitating the efficient
purchase and sale of real estate.' As two prominent scholars wrote recently: "In
sum, the American open public record allows citizens to oversee their government,
facilitates a vibrant economy, improves efficiency, reduces costs, creates jobs, and
provides valuable products and services that people want.'" 5 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has recognized that free-flowing commercial information is vital to a healthy
economy and used that principle as a basis for providing First Amendment
protection to advertising.4"
The Department of Justice, whose job it is to oversee FOIA operations and to
defend agencies sued for withholding records requested under FOIA,"7 has
followed the lead of the Supreme Court by relying only on a privacy-side uses and
effects analysis in crafting its FOIA policy. For instance, the Department of Justice
has suggested that the privacy analysis should consider the ultimate impact on
personal privacy even if it involves several steps in a "causal chain" from disclosure
to potential privacy invasion.40 ' The department contended that it would not be
pragmatic to evaluate the individual interest in privacy without considering
derivative uses and resulting secondary effects.' This position stands as official
federal policy in handling FOIA requests. The Department of Justice further
bolstered its privacy-side emphasis when Attorney General Ashcroft issued a
* See CATE & VARN, supra note 23, at 10-11.
Id. at 10-13. For instance, the authors cited data indicating that consumers save as
much as $100 billion due to efficiencies in lending, facilitated by data available to lenders
in public records. See id. at 11.
405 Id. at 13.
See Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,765 (1976). The
Court stated:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation
of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private
economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable.
40' 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
408 FOIA GUIDE, supra note 47, at 331 (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees
v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
" See id. at 331.
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memorandum to the federal agencies urging them to use the privacy exemptions to
reject FOIA requests for records.41 ° Although the memo was issued only a month
after the September 11 th terrorist attacks, the memo was planned and written much
earlier,"' thus demonstrating that it represented a deliberate policy decision for the
long term and not simply an expedient tactic in the war on terrorism.
In its FOIA privacy-exemption cases, the Supreme Court has paid little
deference to the societal harm than can result from official government policy that
favors secrecy over access. This harm ultimately includes the risks of a less-
informed electorate and weakened democratic participation and self-governance.4 12
Robert Gellman, a former chief counsel to the Subcommittee on Government
Information, has concluded generally that it constitutes bad public policy when
government controls information through such means as denials of access.413 He
said such practices also inhibit democracy, especially when federal agencies use
FOIA to withhold information because it might be politically embarrassing or cast
the agency in a bad light. 4 The so-called "presumption of legitimacy" for
government records created by the Supreme Court in Ray seems to facilitate such
improper nondisclosure motives. 1
410 See NEw ATrORNEY GENERAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 29. In a sharp reversal of
policy set eight years earlier under the Clinton Administration, Attorney General Ashcroft
established a new and restrictive administration policy on how executive-branch agencies
should treat requests for federal records under FOIA. In an October 12, 2001 memorandum
to the federal executive-branch agencies, Ashcroft rescinded the 1993 FOIA foreseeable-
harm standard set by former Attorney General Janet Reno, who had emphasized "maximum
responsible disclosure of government information" unless disclosure would be harmful.
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 37, at 4-5. Under the Ashcroft standard, agencies are
encouraged to use FOIA's two privacy exemptions (Exemptions 6 and 7(C)) and the
executive-privilege exemption (Exemption 5) to withhold records containing certain types
of information whenever agency discretion allows, as long as there is a "sound legal basis"
to do so. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)6, (b)7(C), (b)5 (2000).
41 See Adam Clymer, Government Openness at Issue As Bush Holds On to Records, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 3, 2003, at Al.
412 See, e.g., Beall, supra note 225 at 1252 (stating that failure to protect public access to
government information "will lead to a less informed public... [and will] undermine[] the
essential goal of public information law - to establish the people as governors over the
government").
411 See Robert M. Gellman, Twin Evils: Government Copyright and Copyright-like
Controls over Government Information, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv. 999, 1005-13 (1995) (stating
"[i]n theory, the Copyright Act and FOIA work together to ensure public availability and
unrestricted use of government data").
414 Id. at 1011-12.
4i1 See Sinrod, supra note 26, at 214-15 (stating that the presumption of legitimacy has
the potential to further distort the balancing process in FOIA privacy-exemption cases).
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B. Categorizing Derivative Uses and Expanding the Public Interest in
Disclosure
Ideally, federal information policy should support public access to government
information for the myriad lawful purposes to which it might be put to use.4 16 This
is precisely why federal copyright law specifically prohibits the federal government
from copyrighting information. 417 Congress crafted section 105 of the Copyright
Act, which prohibits the federal government from copyrighting information, to help
prevent the government from exploiting government information for political
reasons, and also to keep the government from holding a monopoly on government
information.41 Copyright law, coupled with FOIA, thus establishes double-barreled
support for the proposition that federal information policy should favor broad public
access to federal records so that the information can be used for lawful purposes.4 19
Such a policy seems to support consideration of derivative uses and secondary
effects on the access side of the FOIA balance in privacy-exemption cases.420
Clearly, federal agency records are useful to a varied host of requesters
including attorneys, businesses and corporations, advocacy groups, public interest
groups, scholars, andjournalists. And these uses often include many purposes other
than the official reasons for which the requested information was originally
collected by the government. For instance, in the FOIA privacy-exemption cases
discussed in this article, requesters included a university law review researching an
article on military disciplinary procedures, 421 journalists investigating citizenship
information on two Iranian nationals, 422 journalists investigating connections
between an allegedly corrupt U.S. Representative and alleged members of an
416 See Gellman, supra note 413, at 1003-04 ("Placing federal government information
... in the public domain is a step in the direction of permitting unfettered use of the
information.").
417 See id.
418 See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1982); see also Gellman, supra note 413, at 1002-04 (pointing
out that the Federal Copyright Act of 1976 specifically prohibits the government from
invoking copyright protection as a means of exerting official control over the use of
government information).
419 Gellman, supra note 413, at 1004, 1007-08; see also HENRY H. PERRIMr, LAW AND
THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY, 477 (1996) (stating that FOIA is an "instrument of the
diversity principle" and "undercuts efforts to establish [government] information
monopolies"); Irina Dmitrieva, Comparison of US and UK Copyright Laws Regarding
Ownership of Primary Law Materials (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Florida).
40 One commentator already has recommended that courts in the FOIA privacy-exemption
cases consider derivative uses when weighing both the public interest in access and the
individual interest in nondisclosure. See Sinrod, supra note 26, at 219.
421 See Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
422 See Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982).
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organized crime family,42 3 an attorney seeking information to assist Haitian
immigrants seeking political asylum in the United States,424 labor unions seeking
information in order to communicate with federal employees about collective
bargaining,425 and a nonprofit environmental group seeking information to facilitate
communication with individuals who were receiving allegedly biased environmental
mailings from the federal government.
4 6
On the basis of studying these Supreme Court FOIA privacy-exemption cases,
along with a review of lower federal court opinions on the access-privacy
conflict,427 the authors of this article have categorized the most common derivative
uses of public information into three areas: (1) public informational uses, (2) public-
policy advocacy uses, and (3) commercial uses. Public informational uses would
include use of agency records byjournalists, scholars, and nonprofit public-interest
groups that monitor government. Public-policy advocacy uses would include the
use of public records by organizations that advocate positions and seek certain
outcomes on social and public policy issues such as collective bargaining, the
environment, abortion, gun control, and stem-cell research. Commercial uses would
include use of public records by marketers, advertisers, lawyers and corporations,
all of whom engage in activities that provide varying degrees of economic benefit
to society.
When considering the public-interest value of access to personally-identifiable
information in a FOIA privacy-exemption dispute, a court applying a public-interest
side derivative-uses analysis might look to these categories to help gain a
423 See Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749
(1989).
424 See Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991).
425 See Dep't of Def. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
426 See Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355 (1997) (per curiam).
427 See Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Dep't of Labor, 280 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2002); Sherman
v. Dep't of the Army, 244 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2001); Lepellier v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 164
F.3d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local 19 v. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, 135 F.3d 891 (3d Cir. 1998); Davin v. Dep't of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1995);
Rosenfield v. DOJ, 57 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1995); Becker v. IRS, 34 F.3d 398 (7th Cir. 1994);
Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238 (1994); Painting Indus. of Haw. Mkt. Recovery Fund v. Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 26 F.3d 1479 (9th Cir. 1994); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227
(3d Cir. 1993); FLRA v. Dep't of the Navy, 975 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1992); FLRA v. Dep't
of the Navy, 966 F.2d 747 (1992); FLRA v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 958 F.2d 503 (1992);
Landano v. Dep't of Justice, 956 F.2d 422 (3d Cir. 1992); Painting & Drywall Work Pres.
Fund, Inc. v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 936 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Hopkins v.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 929 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1991); KTVY-TV v. United States, 919
F.2d 1465 (10th Cir. 1990); Navigator Publ'g, L.L.C. v. Dep't of Transp., 146 F. Supp. 2d
68 (D. Me. 2001); Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 19 v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs,
940 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Cardona v. INS, No. 93-C3912, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1853 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 1995); see also Beall, supra note 225, at 1264-83; Sinrod, supra
note 26, at 219-23.
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meaningful understanding of the true public benefits that access can provide. For
instance, journalists often use personally-identifiable information as a means of
locating sources to interview and, as a result, obtain pertinent information about
government operations.428 In this manner, information from public records can act
as a "link" to additional information that can allow journalists to more fully
investigate the official government and actions.429 For instance, the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press recently pointed out in How to Use the Federal
FOI Act430 that FOIA can provide reporters with information that can be used to
identify leads and sources for investigative stories on potential government
malfeasance.
Permitting such journalistic access thus serves the public interest by facilitating
the press' role as a government watchdog that examines and-evaluates governmental
operations.43" ' In fact, the very scrutiny that this kind of use makes possible is
entirely in keeping with the "central purposes" doctrine for the purpose of revealing
"what... government is up to. '  Similarly, such a derivative-uses analysis can
be applied to FOIA requests by scholars, public-interest and public-education
groups, unions, businesses, and other profit and nonprofit informational and
advocacy entities.
At the heart of a balancing test that considers these proposed categories of use
is the explicit recognition that a derivative-uses analysis is indeed relevant to both
sides of the privacy-access balance: the public interest value of certain records
might not be fully understood without considering how the information would be
used once disclosed. Similarly, the authors of this article appreciate that the
individual privacy interests at stake might not be fully revealed until the privacy
impact on individuals named in records is considered in light of the public's use of
the information. The authors understand that many FOIA activists and FOIA users
may oppose uses and effects analyses on either side of the balance because of their
justifiable concerns that such a practice can be exploited by agencies to defend
withholding records.433 But the stubborn fact remains that the Supreme Court is
42' See Sinrod, supra note 26, at 227-30.
429 See id.
430 See generally REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, How TO USE THE
FEDERALFOI ACT, (Rebecca Daugherty ed., 8th ed. 1998) available at http://www.rcfp.org/
foiact.
411 See Sinrod, supra note 26, at 228-31.
432 Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772
(1989) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
4' Typically, FOIA supporters maintain that the plain language and legislative history of
the statute makes clear that FOIA requests can be made for any public or private purpose, and
therefore considering the purpose of any request is irrelevant. See Hearings, supra note 24;
RFCP REPORT, supra note 24; Leahy, supra note 24; see also Halstuk & Davis, supra note
80.
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already applying a uses-and-effects rationale on the privacy side, and it is unlikely
the Court will cease doing so. Short of a congressional remedy, which seems
unlikely at this point, the best practical solution is support for uses-and-effects
considerations coupled with insistence that they be fairly applied to both sides of
the access/privacy balance once a FOIA privacy exemption has been appropriately
triggered. The authors caution here that they are not proposing any type of public
purpose requirement for requesters to establish as a prerequisite to gaining access
to FOIA records. FOIA contains no such prerequisite, and the access/privacy
balance only becomes relevant after a FOIA privacy exemption is triggered.4 34
VII. CONCLUSION
As illustrated by the foregoing discussion and analysis, the Supreme Court has
used the central-purpose doctrine and a privacy-side-only derivative-uses analysis
to ensure that all personally-identifiable information in federal records remains
closed even when the individual interest in privacy is admittedly weak. While the
interest in individual privacy is important and should be afforded due consideration
under FOIA, the public interest in access should not be relegated to a minor factor
as it has been by the Supreme Court in its FOIA privacy-exemption holdings.
A broader view of the FOIA-related public interest than has been accepted by
the Supreme Court, including consideration of derivative uses on the public-interest
side of the balance, would go a long way toward resetting FOIA balance to more
fully embrace the congressional intent of providing a broad public access to
government information. This goal also would be served by narrowing FOIA-
related privacy interest to more fully reflect Congressional intent that only real and
substantial privacy incursions should be sufficient to close public records under
FOLA. Reconfiguring the privacy-exemption trigger from simply any personally-
identifiable information to that which is intimate in nature, would more fully
comply with congressional intent to not allow FOLA privacy exemptions to be used
as broad barriers against disclosure,435 which, arguably they have become. If the
434 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION REFERENCE GUIDE (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/reference
guidemay99.htm (last revised Dec. 2002).
... Such an approach might be based, for instance, on Professor Rodney Smolla's
proposed zones of "quintessentially intimate... matters" that include:
(1) mental and emotional condition, including grief; (2) physical health; (3) love
and sexual relationships, including sexual orientation; (4) decisions concerning
procreation, including a decision to have an abortion; (5) family relationships;
(6) victimization, including whether the individual has been a victim of violent
or sexual assault; (7) intense and close-knit associational memberships and
affiliations; (8) deep personal beliefs, such as religious convictions; and (9)
personal financial matters.
SMOLLA, supra note 322, at 128.
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Supreme Court continues its current FOIA jurisprudence in privacy-exemption
cases, Congress should consider amending FOIA to better and more strictly define
the privacy interest that is needed to trigger the privacy exemptions.
Finally, the implications of constitutional privacy as a potential bar to
disclosure should not be overlooked in the discussion of the FOIA privacy
exemptions. As demonstrated in this article, the Supreme Court has found that there
are constitutionally-protected zones of individual privacy that would preclude
government release of personally-identifiable information such as the medical
information at issue in Whalen v. Roe.436 In those instances, the constitutional
protection for privacy would most likely trump the statutory right of access
provided by FOIA unless there is a constitutionally compelling reason to allow
access.
Former Chief Justice Burger's admonition to Congress that public access to
government-held information should be achieved by "carefully drawn legislation"437
has yet to be followed in the context of FOIA's current language describing the
privacy exemptions. It is the recommendation of these authors that Congress better
craft FOIA privacy exemptions to comply with the legislative goal of broad public
access and, in the alternative, that the courts expand the narrow confines of the
central-purpose doctrine as it has been applied in recent FOIA privacy-exemption
cases. In the long term, the preservation of democracy, the cultivation of an
educated and informed public, and the facilitation of a vigorous free-market
economy seem to preclude a defacto rule against the disclosure of all personally-
identifiable information collected by the federal government.
436 See 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
417 Houchinsv. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1978) (quoting Potter Stewart, OrofthePress,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975)).
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